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The following pages make a case for the important role played by Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
α 2 982b11–21 in Renaissance poetics and especially in that of  Girolamo Fracastoro.
As this passage, and Aristotle’s Metaphysics in general, have traditionally been denied 
a major role in the poetics of  the Renaissance, I have been obliged to develop my 
argument in three sections. [1.] The first focuses on Thomas Aquinas’s groundbreaking 
reading of  the quotation in psychological and epistemological terms, and on how he 
and his contemporaries were able to harmonize it both with the corpus Aristotelicum and 
with the development of  a place for poetry in the system of  the arts. [2.] The second 
section illustrates how the first humanists used Aristotle’s authority to invert the 
meaning of  the passage, transforming it into an argument in defense of  the primacy 
of  poetry over the rest of  the arts. This appropriation had two undesiderable effects: 
either depriving the passage of  its theoretical implications or, worse, assimilating 
Aristotle’s words into a Platonizing vision of  poetry. Only with the recovery of  the 
Greek text of  Aristotle’s Poetics in the late fifteenth century did the passage escape its 
new status as a commonplace in humanist defense of  poetry, and was briefly again 
considered as a point of  departure for the analysis of  concepts such as fabula (fiction) 
and admiratio (wonder), based on philosophical, poetic, and medical premises. [3] The 
last section introduces Galeotto Marzio’s and Giovanni Pontano’s pioneering works 
on these two concepts—fabula and admiratio—, as an introduction to the subsequent 
synthesis done by Girolamo Fracastoro, who, from the positions held by Marzio 
and Pontano as well as Aquinas’s original intuition, was able to harmonize natural 
philosophy and poetry by means of  their psychological implications. This is what I 
have called here the ‘medical poetics of  wonder’ or, more simply, mythotherapy.
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resumen
Este trabajo defiende un argumento en realidad muy simple: el valor teórico que un 
famoso pasaje de la Metafísica (982b11-21) de Aristóteles tuvo para la poética renacen-
tista y, en particular, para Girolamo Fracastoro.
Dado que la Metafísica ha quedado habitualmente desatendida en los trabajos sobre 
poética renacentista, me he visto forzado a dividir mi argumento en tres partes. [1.] A 
partir de las citas y comentarios de Tomás de Aquino al pasaje, muestro cómo el do-
minico fue el primer comentarista latino en leerlo en clave psicológica y gnoseológica, 
y cómo tanto él como sus contemporáneos lo armonizaron con el corpus Aristotelicum, 
por un lado, y, por otro, con la clasificación de la poesía en el sistema de artes. [2.] En 
la segunda parte, explico cómo los primeros humanistas se apropiaron del pasaje para 
transferirlo al argumentario a favor de la primacía de la poesía sobre el resto de artes, 
con dos efectos indeseables: bien con un empobrecimiento teórico, bien asimilándolo 
a una visión platonizante de la poesía. Solo con la recuperación manuscrita del texto 
griego de la Poética de Aristóteles a finales del siglo XV, este pasaje consigue sustraerse 
de la polémica sobre la clasificación de las artes, para ser brevemente considerado 
como punto de partida para el análisis de fabula y admiratio desde premisas filosóficas, 
poéticas y médicas. [3.] La última parte aborda dos pioneros en la recuperación teórica 
de ambos términos en su nuevo contexto —Galeotto Marzio y Giovanni Pontano— 
y la labor de síntesis que sobre las posturas encarnadas por ambos, y sobre la intuición 
originaria de Aquino, lleva a cabo Girolamo Fracastoro, que armonizará filosofía na-
tural y poesía a través de sus implicaciones en el intelecto, lo que he llamado aquí la 
‘poética médica de la maravilla’ o, más sencillamente, mitoterapia.
palaBras clave: Metafísica α 2 982b11-21, fabula, admiratio, maravilla, historia de las 
emociones, medicina, psicología de la literatura, literatura y filosofía, Aristóteles, Tomás 
de Aquino, Galeotto Marzio, Giovanni Pontano, Plotino, Girolamo Fracastoro.
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uati, pariter succurre medenti:
utraque tutelae subdita cura tuae est.
Ovid, Remedia amoris, 75–78
I realized that the poet’s real work lays not in poetry; 
but in the invention of  reasons for poetry to be admired.
Jorge Luis Borges, The Aleph
The purpose of  the following pages is twofold.1 On the one hand, I aim to 
explore two different yet complementary manifestations of  the increasing interest 
in the philosophical value of  fiction during the Renaissance, and, on the other, to 
analyze how fiction served as a device for introducing and contesting philosophical, 
scientific, and theological issues from the 1490s to the 1550s. The reader familiar 
with these topics will certainly miss in my approach an extensive treatment of  the 
tradition of  the theologia poetica, and, though not exactly equivalent, a discussion of  
the composition of  philosophical fables—and the theory behind it—by Poliziano, 
Antonio Urceo, and Erasmus, among others.
One of  the reason for having neglected the first tradition is the vast amount 
of  bibliography that has considered the problem properly; as for the second, 
the reader will find in this volume an article by Professor Giglioni that surpasses 
in expertise and scope anything that I could possibly have done. But the main 
motive for the research in these pages is the surprising lack of  scholarly attention 
paid to the psychological, gnoseological, and metaphysical value accorded to the 
concept of  admiratio—understood both as the emotion experienced when, while 
contemplating, listening to, or reading a work of  art, a truth is perceived; but also 
as the craft necessary for producing such an emotion—in the above-mentioned 
period. Thus, I propose to stress in this contribution the particular set of  
ramifications that admiratio had for the development of  a concept of  philosophical 
fiction that did not correspond to the extensive discussion of  rhetoric and poetics 
1 This article was first delivered as two complementary talks at the 63rd Annual Convention of  
the Renaissance Society of  America (2017, Chicago). I want to express my gratitude to all the 
participants who presented their papers in the two panels, “Impact of  Fiction on Early Modern 
Philosophy,” both for their presence and for their commentaries. I would also like to thank 
David Quint, Luc Deitz, and Thomas Leinkauf  for being in the audience of  the panels and 
for their comments and reservations. They have made this final version much more carefully 
thought-through, and now it should be read, partly at least, as a conversation with them. I would 
also like to thank Jon Nelson, Ignacio García Pinilla, and Darrel Rutkin for their comments and 
corrections on the Latin text and its translation added as an appendix to this text.
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inherited from classical antiquity. As a matter of  fact, my main thesis will be that 
this ‘philosophical’ approach to fiction evolved, to a certain extent, independently 
of  both disciplines in their traditional forms.
To show this, I shall evaluate three separate manifestations of  the philosophical 
notion of  admiratio and how it related to literary devices. The first is how it was 
incorporated in the thirteenth century as a important aspect of, so to speak, a 
‘philosophy of  literature,’ and how this groundbreaking approach faded in the 
hands of  the early humanists. The second is how late-fifteenth century humanists 
reinterpreted the concept; and the third, departing from the major trends of  
ancient and medieval interpretation of  Metaphysics α 2 982b11–21, is how it was 
transformed, in the late poetics of  Girolamo Fracastoro, into a justification, not of  
the metaphysical value of  poetry, but of  poetry as an expression of  the practical 
dimensions of  philosophy.
1. arIsToTle and aquInas on Mythophilia
Aristotle, the least enthusiastic lover of  fables of  all philosophers, was the 
first to coin the term philomythos in a very well-known passage of  book alpha of  
his Metaphysics:
That [the Metaphysics] is not a science of  production is clear even from the history 
of  the earliest philosophers. For it is owing to their wonder [διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν] 
that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize; they wondered 
[θαυμάσαντες] originally at the obvious difficulties, then advanced little by little and 
stated difficulties about the greater matters, e.g. about the phenomena of  the moon 
and those of  the sun and of  the stars, and about the genesis of  the universe. 
And a man who is puzzled and wonders thinks himself  ignorant [ὁ δ᾽ ἀπορῶν καὶ 
θαυμάζων οἴεται ἀγνοεῖν] (whence even the lover of  myth [φιλόμυθος] is in a sense a 
lover of  wisdom [φιλόσοφος], for the myth is composed of  wonders [ὁ γὰρ μῦθος 
σύγκεται ἐκ θαυμάσίων]); therefore, since they philosophized in order to escape 
from ignorance, evidently they were pursuing science in order to know, and not for 
any utilitarian end.2
2 Metaphysics α 2 982b11–21, Aristotle 1924, pp. 120. Compare the new critical edition by 
O. Primavesi: ὅτι δ᾽ οὐ ποιητική, δῆλον καὶ ἐκ τῶν πρώτων φιλοσοπηάντων. διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν 
οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν ἀπόρων 
θαυμάσαντες, εἶτα κατὰ μικρὸν οὕτω προϊόντες καὶ περὶ τῶν πειζόνων διαπορήσαντες, οἶοω περί τε 
τῶν τῆς σελἠνης παθημάτων καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸν ἥλιον καὶ ἄστρα καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γενέσεως, ὁ δ᾽ 
ἀπορῶν καὶ θαυμάζων οἴεται ἀγνοεῖν (διὸ καὶ φιλόμυθος ὁ φιλόσοφος πώς ἐστιν ὁ γὰρ μῦθος σύγκεται 
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In this excerpt, Aristotle performed two important operations in coining the 
term. In the first place, he established an imprecise hiatus between the philosopher 
and the philomythos. By so doing, as I will mention below, book α of  the Metaphysics 
played a major role in the recovery of  the ideal of  the poeta theologus by early 
humanists. Secondly, he established this relationship by stressing that wonder 
(θαυμάζειν) was the point of  departure for the thought of  both the philosopher 
and the philomythos. As a consequence, somebody interested in the history of  
mythophilia will be forced to pay attention—as wonder, together with melancholy, 
are so to speak the philosophical emotions par excellence—to its links with the 
history of  philosophical wonder, which will prove not only to be a productive 
way of  approaching mythophilia, but also of  providing a general framework within 
which the links between philosophy and literature, or the impact of  literature on 
philosophy, would be expanded during the Renaissance.
Despite the fact that some further commentaries on Aristotle’s philomythos could 
be found in classical tradition,3 to my knowledge Thomas Aquinas was the first 
medieval thinker to consider the introduction of  philosophical wonder in Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics as a psychological and gnoseological issue. In the treatise on the passions 
contained in the Summa Theologica [1265–1273], he tackles wonder both as a cause 
ἐκ θαυμάσίων). ὥστ᾽ εἴπερ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἐφιλοσόφησαν, φανερὸν ὅτι διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ 
ἐδίωκον καὶ οὐ χρήσεως τινος ἕνεκεν,” Aristotle 2012a, p. 473. William of  Moerbeke’s translation 
reads as follows: “Quia vero non activa, palam ex primis philosophantibus. Nam propter 
admirari homines nunc et primum incoeperunt philosophari: a principio quidem quae in 
promptu dubitabilium mirantes, deinde paulatim procedentes, et de maioribus dubitantes, ut de 
lunae passionibus, et de his quae circa solem et astra, etiam de universi generatione. Qui vero 
dubitat et admiratur ignorare videtur. Quare et philomythes philosophus aliqualiter est. Fabula 
namque ex miris constituitur. Quare, si ad ignorantiam effugiendam philosophati sunt, palam 
quia propter scire, studere persecuti sunt, et non usus alicuius causa,” in Aristotle 1982, p. 15.
3 Apart from a previous mention in passing in Plato’s Theaetetus (155c–d), there is a short allusion 
to these “theologians” in Cicero’s De natura deorum III. xxI. 53; an extensive commentary on 
Varro’s three genres of  theology (fabulosa, naturalis, civilis) recalled in Augustine’s De civitate Dei 
(VI. v–x) (Van Nuffelen 2010, pp. 162–88)—; and a hint in Lactantius, De ira Dei 11: “All those 
who are cultivated as gods were men, and the same were the earliest and greatest kings. […] 
And both the oldest Greek writers, whom they call Theologoi, and also the Romans, following 
and imitating the Greeks, teach this, and chief  among them, Euhemerus and our own Ennius 
who point out the births, marriages, progenies, commands, deeds, passings, tombs of  all of  
them […],” 1962, p. 87. The idea entered into early medieval encyclopedism through Isidore 
of  Seville, Etymologies VIII. VII. 2–9 (2006, pp. 180b–181a), and Rabanus Maurus, De universo 
libri XXII IV. V. De clericis and XV. II. De poetis both in Patrologia Latina 111, cols. 92A and 
419B–C and id. Excerptio de Arte Grammatica Prisciani, ibid. cols. 666D–667A. 
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of  enjoyment and of  fear.4 A commonly—and wrongly—accepted solution to this 
paradoxical approach has been to say that Aquinas held that a contiguous relation 
existed between the two passions. In truth, this ambivalence of  wonder (admiratio) 
stems both from the sources employed by the Dominican friar and from the lexical 
limitations of  medieval Latin when compared to classical Greek.
Thus, Aquinas follows Aristotle when he refers to desire and enjoyment, but 
as he expounds his ideas on sorrow, fear, and wrath, he abandons the classical 
listings of  pathemata, relying instead on John of  Damascus’s De fide orthodoxa and 
Nemesius’s De natura hominis. In sum, admiratio refers in Aquinas to two different 
Greek concepts: Aristotelian θαυμάζειν (thaumazein) which is, in the domain of  the 
passions, an efficient cause that motivates the agent—in other words, joy stems 
from the hope of  understanding the object of  wonder, as learning is a source of  
pleasure—; and Damascenian and Nemesian κατάπληξις (kataplêxis), which refers, 
on the other hand, to the process by which admiration turns into distress for the 
subject who experiences it, motivated by the anticipation of  danger.5 This danger, 
according to Aquinas, must be understood in epistemological terms, that is, as 
the anticipation of  a great difficulty, or the impossibility for the subject to acquire 
certainty on a given object of  speculation.
Aquinas’s approach to the topic permeates Renaissance thought deeply 
enough to arise in Descartes. During the seventeenth century, those philosophers 
involved in the study of  the passions of  the soul would establish a neat distinction 
between wonder and astonishment, although it is uncommon to quote Aquinas’s 
Summa as the basis for the development of  such ideas. Thus, Descartes points 
out in The Passions of  the Soul [Les passsions de l’âme, 1649] the dangers of  excessive 
wonder, and establishes a distinction between functional wonder (admiration) and 
stupefying astonishment (estonnement).6 Whereas the former can be of  use both for 
mnemonic purposes and for stimulating the thirst for knowledge, the latter—an 
“excess of  wonder”—can descend into a “beclouding” of  the mind of  the subject 
who experiences it, or into a mere craving for novelty but not for real knowledge.
Although Aquinas’s ideas on wonder as found in the Summa made an impact 
on European culture lasting well beyond the sixteenth century, they neither suffice 
4 Aquinas, Summa Theologica Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4.
5 Vega 1992, p. 36n19; cf. Daston and Park 1998, p. 113. John Damascene 1955, p. 122: “Admiratio 
vero est timor ex magna imaginatione. Stupor vero est timor ex inassueta imaginatione;” Nemesius 
1975: 103, 1987: 81. Aquinas, Summa Theologica III, q. 15, a. 8; see also Gondreau 2009, pp. 217ff.
6 Descartes 1985, pp. 354–356. Cf. Daston and Park 1998, pp. 316–17.
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to offer a complete overview of  his approach to wonder, nor do they completely 
explain my view of  the problem. Therefore, another passage, this time from his 
Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics [1270–1272], needs to be recalled:
It is known that doubt [dubitatio] and wonder [admiratio] both originate in ignorance: 
when we observe clear effects whose cause we ignore, we admire their cause. Now, 
as wonder [admiratio] is the reason for philosophy, it is clear that the philosopher 
is to some extent a philomythos, that is, a lover of  fables, what is proper to poets. 
That is the reason why the first men who occupied themselves with the causes 
of  things by means of  fables are called theologian poets [poetas theologizantes]; 
such were Perseus and some others, which were the Seven wise men. Therefore, 
here is the reason why the philosopher is considered a poet: both deal with that 
which causes wonder. For the fable poets are concerned with what stems from 
certain marvellous phenomena [quibusdam mirabilibus]; philosophers are also lead to 
philosophy from wonder [admiratione].7
With regards to Aquinas’s take on the theologian poets in the second excerpt: it 
encapsulates two important issues about the conception of  philosophy (theology) 
and poetry for medieval scholasticism. First, while Aquinas’s admiratio corresponds 
to the Aristotelian θαυμάζειν, his allusion to wonder as mirabilia seems to be mainly 
cultural. 8 In other words, even though he states that the philosopher and the 
poet share a common gnoseological impulse, the latter’s attention is drawn to 
bewilderment while the former moves to philosophical inquiry, which is far from 
7 Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio I, lesson 3, ch. 2, §55: “Constat 
autem, quod dubitatio et admiratio ex ignorantia provenit. Cum enim aliquos manifestos effectus 
videamus, quorum causa nos latet, eorum tunc causam admiramur. Et ex quod admiratio fuit 
causa inducens ad philosophiam, patet quod philosophus est aliqualiter philomythes, idest 
amator fabulae, quod proprium est poetarum. Unde primi, qui per modum quemdam fabularem 
de principiis rerum tractaverunt, dicti sunt poëtae theologizantes, sicut fuit Perseus et quidam 
alii qui fuerunt septem sapientes. Causa autem, quare philosophus comparatur poëtae, est ista, 
quia uterque circa miranda versatur. Nam fabulae circa quas versantur poëtae, ex quibusdam 
mirabilibus constituntur. Ipsi etiam philosophi ex admiratione moti sunt ad philosophandum,” 
Aquinas 2004, p. 96. See the important remarks by Umberto Eco 2012, pp. 198–200.
8 See, for instance, Aquinas, De memoria et reminiscentia Commentarium 450a32 (2005, pp. 199 and 
249n9): “Yet it does happen that one firmly retains in his memory things that he encounters as a 
child. The vigor of  a motion may cause things we marvel at to be more deeply impressed upon 
our memory. We chiefly wonder about new and unusual things and newborn children tend 
to marvel at things still more because they are not used to them, and for this reason too they 
remember firmly. On the other hand, with respect to the fluid condition of  their body, children 
are naturally liable to slips of  memory,” and the Expositio super Iob ad Litteram, chs. 4, 18 and 35.
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being a slip of  the pen by the Dominican theologian.9 Second, Aquinas stresses 
that the link between the philomythos and the philosopher could be loose insofar 
as their historical order of  appearance is neglected. That is, mythophilia possesses 
barely more than an archaeological interest—as philosophy’s arcane predecessor—
for (true) philosophy, since poetry’s function is simply to move a person to virtue, 
as he states in his well-known preface to Aristotle’s Analytica priora [1270].10
Nonetheless, Aquinas’s masters, contemporaries, and heirs could manifest 
more daring in this regard, as they usually construed Aristotle’s assertion in 
Metaphysics α 2 982b11–21 as a direct comparison, rather than a hiatus, between 
philosophy and poetry. As a matter of  fact, a casual reader could easily see the 
implications involved in this equivalence simply by paying attention to direct 
glosses and commentaries on the Aristotelian passage. Thus, in Albert the Great’s 
Metaphysics [1263–1267]11 and in Ulrich of  Strassburg’s Liber de sumo bono [¿1265–
1269?],12 poetry is presented as an art with a threefold nature: with respect to its 
9 See, for instance, the parallels with Bacon’s (2000, pp. 148–149) treatment of  instantiae deviantes.
10 “At other times only an estimation [existimatio] inclines to one part of  the contradiction, 
on account of  some representation, in the way that a man may conceive disgust at a certain 
food if  it is represented to him under similitude of  something disgusting; to this the Poetics 
pertains, for it is the poet’s function to lead us to virtue through a fitting representation. All 
of  these pertain to rational philosophy, for it is the function of  reason to lead from one thing 
to another” (Quandoque vero sola existimatio declinat in aliquam partem contradictionis propter aliquam 
repraesentationem, ad modum quo fit homini abominatio alicuius cibi, si repraesentetur ei sub similitudine 
alicuius abominabilis. Et ad hoc ordinatur poetica; nam poetae est inducere ad aliquod virtuosum per aliquam 
decentem repraesentationem. Omnia autem haec ad rationalem philosophiam pertinent: inducere enim ex uno 
in aliud rationis est) Aquinas 2009, p. 791. 
11 Metaphysicorum libri XIII I, treat. I. chap. VI. In quo ostenditur, quod ista scientia non est activa, 
sed contemplativa: “Est enim admiratio motus ignorantis procedentis ad inquirendum, ut sciat 
causam eius de quod miratur, cuius signum est, quia ipse Philomythes secundum hunc modum 
Philosophus est, quia fabula sua construitur ab ipso ex mirandis […]. Sicut enim in ea parte 
logicae, quae poetica est ostendit Aristoteles, poeta fingit fabulam ut excitet ad admirandum, 
et quod admiratio ulterius excitet ad inquirendum, et sic constet philosophia. Sicut est de 
Phaetonte et sicut de Deucalione monstrat Plato, in qua fabula non intenditur nisi excitatio 
ad mirandum causas duorum diluviorum aquae et ignis ex orbitatione stellarum erraticarum 
provenientium, ut per admirationem causa quaeratur et sciatur veritas, et ideo poesis modum dat 
philosophandi sicut aliae scientiae logices […]. Licet ergo quoad mensuram metri poetria sit sub grammatica, 
tamen quoad intentionem logicae est poesis quaedam pars” (Albertus Magnus 1890b, col. 30b).
12 Liber de sumo bono. I, treat. II, chap. IX. De multis specialibus modis theologiae: “Habet secundo 
modo, modum poeticum, quando veritatem sub integumentis ponit, ut in parabolis Sacre 
Scripture, et hic modus etiam convenit huic scientie, quia, ut dicitur primo Metaphysice, 
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form—verse—it should be linked to the domain of  grammar, but according to 
its intention it should be connected to rhetoric and, finally, to the extent that it 
pursues the manifestation of  truth through premises whose role is to cause acts 
of  imagination,13 it should be ascribed to logic.14 The ground of  this stance is 
as follows: if  poetry were exclusively considered as dependent upon grammar 
and rhetoric, i.e., as a discipline occupied with the knowledge of  metrical norms 
and of  the embellishment and effectiveness of  language (ornatus and pathos), 
truth would be completely absent from its concerns, and poetics could not be 
considered as a science, not even an ancillary one. The position had been held, 
though with varying lines of  reasoning, in Al-Farabius’s Catalogue of  the Sciences, 
Avicenna’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics, and Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the 
Poetics; and soon thereafter echoed in Dominicus Gundissalinus’s On the Division of  
Philosophy (De divisione philosophiae, ca. 1150), in Hermannus Alemannus’s translation 
of  Averroes’s Middle Commentary, finished in 1256, in the Anonymous Question on the 
Nature of  Poetry (Minnis and Scott 1991, pp. 280–1), or in Vincent de Beauvais 
Speculum doctrinale, to mention but a few.15
philomicos [sic], id est, poeta amans fingere fabulas, philosophus est, eo quod poeta ad hoc fingit fabulam: 
ut excitet ad admirandum, et admiratio ulterius excitet ad inquirendum, et sic constet scientia, ut dicit 
Philosophus in sua Poetica [Rhet. 1371a32ff.]. Unde patet quod ipsa dat modum sciendi per modum 
admirandi, sicut alie partes logice dant eum quantum ad modum arguendi, propter quod etiam poesis est pars 
logice quantum ad intentionem, licet quandum ad mensuram metri sit sub grammatica. Eadem ergo ratione 
pertinet iste modus ad hanc scientiam, sed tamen propter hoc non estimandum est scripturam 
hanc aliquid habere fabulosum et falsum; quia, ut dicit Augustinus, ad veritatem parabolae non 
requiritur quod sensus literalis verus sit, sed sufficit quod secundus sensus sit verus, quia oratio 
est vera vel falsa, per hoc quod res per ipsam significata est vel non est. Res autem significata 
principaliter per parabolam non est significatum verborum, sed significatum illius significatum 
quod verba mediante significato suo significat, et ideo patet propositum,” Ulrich de Strasbourg 
1930, pp. 51–52. Ulrich combines the passage of  the Metaphysics with Aristotle’s Rhetoric α 11 
1371a32–b10; the emphases in the quotation are mine.
13 Minnis 2005, pp. 239–274.
14 It was commonly accepted that poetry was the lowest part of  logic, as its main device was 
the imaginative syllogism (Black 1989 and 1990, pp. 209–246). On the implications of  the use 
of  imaginative syllogisms and their imbrication with the rhetorical tradition, see Mehtonen 
2006, pp. 299–303.
15 On the place of  poetry in the medieval systems of  the arts, see Hardison Jr. 1962, pp. 3–23, 
Weisheipl 1965, pp. 54–90, Hugonnard-Roche 1984, pp. 41–75, and Dahan 1990, pp. 5–27. 
On the influence of  these systems and of  the inclusion of  poetry in logic in Renaissance 
poetics, esp. Savonarola’s Apologeticus, see Godman 1988, pp. 31–37.
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Albert the Great provides yet another commonplace for understanding the 
influence of  Metaphysics α 2 982b11–21 during the late middle ages. Through his 
analysis of  transpositiones or traslationes, Albert claims that figurative language—i.e., 
the language of  poetry—can be used as a means for philosophical and theological 
reflection, relying both on the authority of  the Sacred text itself  and on the 
tradition of  allegorical exegesis, and echoing some accents on hermeneutics and 
philosophy previously developed by the Arabic philosophical tradition, mainly 
Averroes. However, when it comes to the possibility of  poetry expressing 
theological truth, Albert makes a distinction that would have an echo not only in 
Aquinas himself, but also in scholastic thought after him,16 and even in Dante—
the figurative language of  poetry could not be compared to that of  the Bible 
for two reasons: the truth behind the ‘poetry’ of  the Bible emanates from God’s 
intelligence, and therefore it is divine, whereas the mirabilia found in poetry are 
crafted by human minds and delivered for human minds’ consumption, and, 
according to another famous passage on poetry in Metaphysics α, ‘poets are liars.’17
These positions would be contested by fourteenth-century classicists such as 
Mussato, Petrarch, Boccaccio, and, later, by Salutati, among others. Their battle 
against scholasticism is usually considered as an intellectual fight to reclaim the 
place of  honor for poetry among the arts and, thereafter, to open up a path to 
classical learning as the core concern of  the study of  literature, whether worldly or 
divine.18 Even though it is commonly accepted that their standpoints—no matter 
16 Minnis 2010, pp. 135–145. 
17 “AD PRIMUM ergo dicendum, quod sacra Scriptura poeticis utitur ex divina sapientia formatis 
et figuratis, in quorum figuris secundum proportionem similitudinum resultant infigurabilia et 
immaterialia, eo quod ab illis et ad illa formata et figurata sunt, et ideo certissima sunt: ex 
certissimis enim oriuntur et ad certissima dirigunt. In poesi autem Philosophorum, mira ex quibus fabula 
componitur, ex fictione humana oriuntur, et per repraesentationem ad humana dirigunt, et ideo deceptoria sunt 
et mendosa. Unde Aristoteles in primo Metaphysicorum: ‘Secundum philosophiam poetae multa 
mentiuntur canentes’,” Summa Theologiae part I, treat. 1, quest. 5, memb. 2 (Albertus Magnus 
1895, col 24b), the emphases are mine. Aristotle’s original passage reads: “Ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε τὸ θεῖον 
φθονερὸν ὲνδἑχεται εἶναι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἀοιδοί, οὔτε τῆς τοιαύτης ἄλλην 
χρὴ νομίζειν τιμιωτέραν,” Aristotle, 2012: 474; “Sed nec divinum invidum esse convenit, sed 
secundum proverbium: ‘multa mentiuntur poëtae.’ Nec ea aliam honorabiliorem oportet existimare,” 
in the translation by William of  Moerbeke (Aristotle 1982, pp. 19); my emphasis. See also 
Albert’s Topica VIII. 1. 3 (1890a, col. 498a).
18 A handful of  classical studies on the subject in Curtius 1940, pp. 1–15, Walker 1972, pp. 
1–41ff., Witt 1977, pp. 538–563, Zaccaria 1986, pp. 281–311, Kallendorf  1995, pp. 41–62, and 
Trinkaus 1995, II, pp. 683–720.
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the differences between them—are to be seen as revolutionary in the context 
of  fourteenth- and fifteenth-century humanism, they most certainly sounded like 
rudimentary outbursts to the ears of  their contemporary scholastic thinkers, and 
there is no discussion of  the fact that early humanism was united in its lack of  
interest in a philosophical approach to poetry or, at least, a milder interest than 
the one they were aiming to attack.19 This can be seen in the early debate between 
Mussato, who appraised the topic defending the possibility of  a divinely inspired 
poetry, and Giovannino of  Mantua, who, as a Dominican, closely adhered to 
Aquinas’s denial of  the identification of  poetry with theology.20 Petrarch himself, 
in several places, made use of  the passage on the philomythos, as would Boccaccio 
and Salutati after him.21 In contrast to Mussato, however, all of  them would deploy 
the idea of  the possibility of  theological poetry, lessening the sacred overtones in 
their defense of  poetry, with ‘sacral’ ones, in Minnis and Scott’s (1991: 390) terms.
In sum, although the value of  early humanists’ defense of  poetry cannot be 
reduced to mere manifestos, their take on some philosophical issues related to 
poetry meant a step backwards when compared to thirteenth- and fourteenth-
century scholasticism. Aristotle’s Metaphysics α 2 982b11–21, which had been critically 
discussed every time the philosophical and theological value of  poetry was under 
examination, became fossilized, a-critically mentioned, and tacitly glossed in the 
“poetics” of  early humanists. As a matter of  fact, from the late-fourteenth century 
onward, the triumphant parading of  this excerpt—after Petrarch set it in motion—
demonstrates that the art of  poetry could occasionally exceed philosophy and even 
theology in achievement and profundity, although the arguments to support the 
idea did not match the boldness of  the statement.22 Consequently, any chance for 
the figure of  the philomythos and the concept of  mythophilia to pave the way for 
creating a ‘philosophy of  literature’ soon began to fade in favor of  Neoplatonism 
and the much more systematic exploration of  poetry provided by Aristotle’s Poetics, 
conferring on the passage an almost exclusively ornamental role.
19 My assertion here seems to go against the grain (Garin 1987, pp. 69–71, 1981, pp. 52–68), 
but I rely on the venerable discussion of  the subject in Curtius 2013, pp. 214–227, Kristeller 
1961, pp. 101ff., and Ronconi 1976.
20 Greenfield 1981, pp. 80 and 87–88.
21 Trinkaus 1979, pp. 18–19 and 99–106, Greenfield 1981, pp. 99, 118–119, and 137.
22 Examples of  the a-critical use of  the passage and its links with Neoplatonism are collected in 
Chevrolet 2007, pp. 73ff. However, there were early criticisms not only of  the theological, but 
also of  the philosophical value of  literary fables, as for instance Poggio’s remark on a manuscript 
copy of  his De avaritia held in the Convento di San Marco, see Garin 1961, pp. 36–37.
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2. ToWards a psychology and an aesTheTIcs of adMiratio. 
 marzIo and ponTano (1490–1499)
Aristotle’s Metaphysics α 2 982b11–21, standing between the line of  defense 
based upon theological poetry and the development of  Neoplatonism, on the 
one hand, and the eclosion of  Neo-Aristotelian poetics, on the other, enjoyed a 
theoretical revival between 1490 and 1540 whose importance, as far as I know, 
has never been treated with the attention it deserves.23 It would be tempting to 
think that its refashioning happened hand in hand with the maturation of  literary 
criticism in humanist Italy, but it seems more likely to me that the reason behind 
it was the discovery of  the Greek text of  Aristotle’s Poetics and the problems it 
posed with regards to the topical comparison of  poet (philomythos) and philosopher 
contained in the Metaphysics.24
23 It will suffice to point out that in such a monumental work as Weinberg’s (1961), Metaphysics 
is only mentioned twice.
24 The systematic translation of  Aristotle’s Opera into Latin took place during the first half  of  
the thirteenth century, see now Hasse 2010. As for the Poetics, the work was translated twice 
into Latin during the middle ages. The first translation was based on Averroes’s Talkhıˉs ≥ kitaˉb al-
shi’r, rendered from Arabic into Latin by Hermannus Alemannus, a monk settled in Toledo, in 
1256—edited by L. Minio-Paluello in 1968 as De arte poetica cum Auerrois expositione—and usually 
referred as Poetria Aristotelis during the middle ages. In 1278, William of  Moerbeke authored a 
second translation directly from Greek, which was edited by E. Valmigli in 1953. Although much 
more accurate, the latter has survived in two manuscripts and its only known readers during 
the fourteenth century were precisely Mussato and Petrarch (Kelly 1979, pp. 205–6, 1993, pp. 
117–8); Alemannus’s version, on the other hand, has survived in 24 manuscripts. According 
to Minnis (2005, p. 252) and others, the reason behind the good fortune of  Alemannus as a 
translator is that he did a better job of  harmonizing his version with scholasticism, both in its 
take on literary composition and in the ethical approach to poetry. Alemannus’s work was the 
first translation into Latin of  Aristotle’s Poetics printed during the Renaissance—Determinatio in 
poetria Aristotilis, Venice: Philipus Venetus (1481), reissued in 1515—, and Averroes’s epitome 
had another two translators into Latin in the sixteenth century: Abraham de Balmes in 1523 
and Jacob Mantinus in 1550 (Cranz and Schmitt 1984). For the transmission of  Aristotle’s 
Poetics during the middle ages, see Tigerstedt 1968, pp. 7–24, Boggess 1970, pp. 278–294, Allen 
1976, pp. 67–81, and once more Kelly 1979, pp. 161–209. On the fate of  the medieval versions 
of  Aristotle’s Poetics during the Renaissance, see Weinberg 1961, I, pp. 351–6 and Cirillo 2004, 
pp. 287–303, and a highly-valuable overview of  the critical tradition of  passages of  the Poetics 
in Schrier 1998. In the late fifteenth century, however, a number of  humanists—Ermolao 
Barbaro and Angelo Poliziano among them—had access to the Greek version of  Aristotle’s 
Poetics, see Branca 1983: 3–36, and the commentaries by Giglioni in this volume.
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According to the constraints of  early humanism, the exhumation of  the Poetics 
meant, on the one hand, that, as scholasticism had claimed, poetry’s function was 
mainly civic, and therefore its aim was somehow shared with rhetoric.25 Revealed 
poetry, on the other hand, remained subjected to Plato and to a number of  
secondary authorities that served to expand the idea of  a veiled truth behind 
poetic fables. So, paradoxically, Aristotelian Poetics found itself  constrained by 
a Platonic framework. To resolve this issue and open up a path to scientific 
poetry and philosophical fable, a number of  humanists reappraised Metaphysics 
α 2 982b11–21, focusing on the meaning or meanings of  fabula (mythos) and 
admiratio, attempting to develop their theoretical implications. Thus, depending 
on how fabula and admiratio were defined, they offered different responses to the 
following questions: Where does admiratio lie in poetry? What are the effects and 
function of  poetic admiratio? Is verse necessary for the fabula to exist? Do poetic 
and philosophical admiratio respond to the same emotion, that is, excitement at 
the intellectual perception of  (hidden, either philosophical or theological) truth? 
And, if  so, which consequences can be drawn from the fact that there is truth in 
poetry, and how, therefore, should fabula be defined? This was the first theoretical 
encounter between Aquinas’s approach to admiratio and the so-called humanistic 
tradition, a melding that, as I will show, would be radically transformed by 
Girolamo Fracastoro.
In the 1490s, tentative answers were articulated in at least three different 
approaches to Metaphysics α 2 982b11–21. None of  them, however, tried to 
respond to all the aforementioned questions at once, nor were they formulated in 
keeping with a shared conceptual framework developed in the context of  the same 
disciplines or written with the same readership in mind. As has been said, these new 
views on the problem transcended late-medieval scholastic ideas on transferences 
or translationes, as well as the inheritance of  Platonic myth-making, the institution 
of  medieval allegory, and the common agreement that poetry should hold no 
more than an ancillary relation to philosophy. The decade’s first discussion on the 
topic appeared in chapter 21 of  De doctrina promiscua [ca. 1490] by Galeotto Marzio, 
whose first edition and translation we present as an appendix to these pages. The 
second was the opposition to Florentine Neoplatonism expressed through the 
radical response to the question about the philosophical, and eventually theological, 
25 For wonder as a response to the three components of  a plot—peripeteia, anagnorisis, and 
alogon—and for the Aristotelian theories on wonder in tragedy and epic in Renaissance poetics, 
see Herrick 1947, pp. 222–226 and esp. Minsaas 2003, pp. 145–171.
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value of  fables, first discussed and enacted by Poliziano’s Lamia [1492],26 much 
developed and played with by Antonio Urceo in his Sermo I [1494–1495],27 and 
taken to its limits by Erasmus in the Praise of  Folly [1509–1511].28 The third can be 
found in the most important treatise on poetics of  the decade—with the possible 
exception of  Bartolomeo della Fonte’s Poetica [ca. 1492]—: Giovanni Pontano’s 
Actius [1494–1499], whose examination of  admiratio would prove highly influential 
during the sixteenth century. For clarity’s sake, I will give my attention only to 
Marzio and Pontano in these pages, leaving for a better occasion the particularities 
and existing links between the approaches of  Poliziano, Urceo, and Erasmus to 
mythophilia and the role played by Aristotle in the adoxographic tradition.
Galeotto Marzio—much better remembered today for his condemnation for 
heresy due to some chapters of  his miscellany On Matters Generally Unknown [De 
incognitis vulgo, ca. 1478], finished a second miscellany, On Many Different Affairs 
[De doctrina promiscua], in 1490, the year of  his death.29 Although the product 
of  intermittent work over several years—some of  the chapters had circulated 
previously—, the final version of  De doctrina promiscua was addressed to Lorenzo 
de Medici and remained in manuscript [Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. 52. 
18] until it was printed in Florence in 1548, and thereafter in 1552 and 1602. 
As far as I know, chapter 21 of  the work has not received any critical attention 
despite its undeniable interest. In it, Marzio provides an apparently disarranged 
26 For the concept of  mythophilia in the later Poliziano and its implications and contrast with 
his previous fables, see esp. Mutini 1972, pp. 86ff., Batkin 1990, pp. 149–156, Candido 2010, 
pp. 103–107, and Giglioni in this same volume.
27 A summary of  the fourteenth Sermones of  Antonio Urceo in Raimondi 1987, pp. 129–147. 
On Sermo I, see Chines 1990, pp. 209–220, 1998, pp. 125–150, and Chines and Severi 2013, 
pp. 51–59.
28 On the links between Antonio Urceo’s Sermo I and another prolusio written in 1509, and 
fictionally declaimed by Dame Folly in front of  the students and professors of  Theology 
at the University of  Paris, see Forni 2012, p. 59 and Chines 2013, pp. 42–43. The textual 
coincidences between the two texts exceed the number indicated in the bibliography, and the 
early editorial history of  Urceo’s Opera omnia—the princeps was published in Bologna in 1502, 
where Erasmus spent part of  1507, and the second edition was printed by Aldus in Venice 
in 1506, where Erasmus spent 1508 at the Aldine press—leaves little doubt about Erasmus’s 
familiarity with the text.
29 Good introductions to Galeotto Marzio in Vasoli 1980, pp. 38–63, Pastore Stocchi 1983, 
pp. 15–50, and Anselmi 2008, pp. 57–103. On De doctrina promiscua, see besides Freza’s (1949, 
pp. xiii–xlix) introduction to his partial edition and translation (chapter 21 is not included); 
Miggiano 2001, pp. 207–240; and Vasoli 2001, pp. 185–205. 
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and peripheral discussion both of  the relation between fiction and philosophy and 
of  the concepts of  fabula and admiratio.
Thus, after succinctly introducing the many acceptations of  fabula in dramatic 
poetry, in the Scriptures, and in mythology, its relation to both truth and verisimilitude, 
and the distinction between fabula and oratory (§§ 1–2), Marzio discards all of  
them for the simple reason that they refer to different and irreconciliable instances 
and, therefore, do not allow for a satisfactory and univocal definition. What is 
interesting about this passage, however, is that, without acknowledging it, Marzio 
has explored and jettisoned as unsatisfactory all the extant acceptations of  mythos 
in the Aristotelian corpus. To solve the problem of  the lack of  a precise definition, 
Marzio offers two differing yet complementary arguments. Following Aristotle’s 
passage on the philomythos, his first argument is that fabulae should not be defined by 
their actuality or their plausability (§§ 1–2), but rather by their capacity to encapsulate 
a hidden truth (§ 3). As a matter of  fact, Marzio would completely sever form 
from truth—hence the history of  the defeat of  Argos by Hermes Trismegistus (§ 
11)—through the comparison of  poetry with painting (§ 12). As a consequence, 
the form in which fabulae are delivered is only important for the less intellectually 
gifted, because form catches their attention and allows them to participate in the 
truth it hides; meanwhile, for philosophers, whose attention is drawn to that hidden 
truth, fabulae require full command of  many disciplines, astrology among them, to 
fully disclose their meaning and awaken wonder.
Marzio, in interpreting the truth of  the fabulae, is not limiting himself  to an 
Euhemeristic view (§ 3), but rather considers them as devices whose interpretation 
permits a full disclosure of  the whole building—the encyclopaedia—of  the liberal 
arts. Expanding the link established by Aquinas in the Summa Theologica between 
mythophilia and the passions of  the soul, the second argument shifts in Marzio 
from the realm of  the active intellect and supernatural life to the effects that fabulae 
produce in the passive intellect and the lower reason of  their listeners and readers 
(§ 5-9). For Marzio, a physician himself, the argument is clear in this regard: even 
though the term fabula may have multiple acceptations, physicians understand it 
univocally (§ 4), that is, by the effect it produces on the intellect of  the listener or 
reader. The implicit consequences could hardly be more extreme: fabula should be 
defined according to the effect it produces in the reader or the listener; accordingly, 
it should be considered as the sum of  the factuality of  the object (of  art), the 
physiological disposition and intellectual capacity of  the spectator, together with 
his proficiency in fully comprehending what the object (of  art) is representing. 
(Not bad for a fifteenth century scholar!)
Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica, vol. 4, n.º 2 (2017): 163-214
Jorge Ledo178
It would be difficult to think of  a treatise more antithetical in its premises 
to Marzio’s approach to mythophilia than Pontano’s Actius [1495/1499]. As we 
have seen, the former is almost insulting in its apparently unstudied approach to 
poetry (fabula) as an object of  inquiry, while the latter is obsessed precisely with the 
opposite, that is, in offering a coherent definition of  poetry based on an exhaustive 
analysis of  form over content, with the aim of  differentiating his object of  study 
from any other forms and disciplines of  discourse. Nonetheless, it is undeniable 
that both texts share a remarkable number of  issues, many of  them introduced 
by the Spanish physician Juan Pardo—psychology, the physiology of  dreams, 
astrology, the effect of  poetry on imagination and intellection—, by Altilius—
such as the relation between poetry and history, the comparison of  poetry with 
painting, and the truth and verisimilitude of  poetry—and even by Paulus Prassicius 
and Pardus in their important discussion on the relation between poetic wonder 
and rhetoric pathos. It could be argued, not without reason, that these are minor 
concerns when the dialogue as a whole and its main topics are considered, and 
given that Pontano attempted with the Actius to provide an extensive answer to the 
following questions: Where does admiratio lie in poetry? What are the differences 
between poetry, history, and oratory? And which are the requisites, function, and 
effects of  poetic admiratio? It is surprising that none of  the scholars of  his work 
have considered the part played by Metaphysics α 2 982b11–21—even as a minor 
factor—in the Actius;30 because, as I hope I have demonstrated already, from the 
thirteenth century onward this passage showed the ability to trigger at least the 
following theoretical questions: Are philosophy and poetry related in any way? If  
so, how should poetry be categorized in the system of  the arts: as a subrogate 
30 As a matter of  fact, Haskell (1998, pp. 507), following Deramaix (1987, p. 210), has denied 
any possible influence of  the Metaphysics on the Actius, and Deramaix (2008, p. 142) himself  has 
recently stated: “L’Actius réinvente le genre de l’art poétique sans Aristote, concilie imitation 
de Virgile et poétique de la variété.” Even if  it is true that Pontano, as far as I know, does not 
mention directly Aristotelian Metaphysics in any of  his major works, and that the link between 
Pontano’s idea of  admiratio has been linked to his treatment of  magnificentia over and over, it 
is equally true that Pontano had in his personal library a printed (as Roick 2017, pp. 65 and 
219n105 correctly points out), not a manuscript, copy of  Aristotle’s Metaphysics (undoubtedly 
the one published by Aldus in June 1, 1497) and that he acquired Aldus’s Greek Aristotle as 
soon as the volumes came from the press; that his knowledge of  Aristotle cannot be denied, 
and that, even if  he had not had a copy of  the Metaphysics, the passage was so frequently 
quoted and mentioned that it is almost impossible that he was unaware of  its existence, not to 
mention the theoretical aspects involved in its discussion during the last two decades of  the 
fifteenth century.
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of  grammar, rhetoric, and even logic, or differentiated from the rest of  the arts 
of  discourse? Is admiratio fundamental to poetry, and, in that case, which kind of  
admiratio, and based on what criteria? Should admiratio, as an emotion, be compared 
to rhetorical pathos, or, following Aristotle’s Metaphysics, would it be better compared 
to philosophical (intellectual, so to speak) emotions such as melancholy? And, such 
being the case, should poetic admiratio be restricted to the domain of  ethics and 
politics, as Plato in the Republic and Aristotle in the Poetics seem to suggest or, on the 
contrary, should it give itself  up to philosophical wonder, and therefore explore the 
hidden causes of  nature? With all this in mind, should we infer that content (fabula) 
is more important than form in poetry and, should it therefore be considered as an 
artistic manifestation of  other disciplines; or is poetry a discipline in itself?
For my interest here, I would like to stress only two ideas present in the Actius. 
The first can be found in the section where, after referring to Platonic frenzy and 
Aristotelian psychology, Juan Pardo comes to the conclusion that it is verse—
in other words, the distinction (excellentia) or magnificence of  the craft of  the 
poet reflected in the poem—which leads to wonder. As a matter of  fact, this 
premise would allow Pontano to establish a neat distinction between poetry and 
oratory, not only from the point of  view of  their approach to language but, more 
importantly, from the effect that they foster in their audience. Thus, oratory seeks 
persuasion, that is, an appeal to the passions, while poetry seeks the recognition 
of  the craft of  the poet, and consequently his fame and glory. This, as should 
be evident to us, is an intellectualized passion, wonder, although the Actius does 
not go further. The second idea appears, again, linked to Pontano’s treatment of  
poetry as a device fundamentally crafted under the premise of  being excellent—
through the means of  poetry itself—and therefore made to excite wonder in the 
reader or listener. In the context of  the object of  imitation, fabula, this marks grosso 
modo a neat distinction between poetry and history. This distinction is not limited 
to the different aims—verse vs. prose—, or to the dispositio, brevity, or quality 
of  the language employed, but rather is found in the object of  imitation itself. 
Following Garin’s summary of  the problem, history is related to the imitation of  
all that is human, but poetry is related to the imitation of  nature, a view that would 
justify Pontano’s own scientific poetry, mainly the Meteora and the Urania.
3. Mythophilia as myThoTherapy. gIrolamo fracasToro 
 (1478–1553)
Marzio and Pontano had an uneven impact on Fracastoro. Marzio pioneered 
in his chapter of  the De doctrina promiscua the maturing of  what could be called 
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a proto-psychology of  literature. The fact that some of  his intuitions were 
developed in works by Pomponazzi or Fracastoro should be attributed more to 
the common speculative milieu of  late-fifteenth and early-sixteenth century Italy 
than to any direct knowledge of  Marzio’s work. On the other hand, the influence 
of  Pontano’s Actius on Fracastoro is undeniable, since it is mentioned in the 
Naugerius [ca. 1540]. As I have argued, Marzio and Pontano should be seen as two 
radical responses to the theoretical problems posed by Metaphysics α 2 982b11–21, 
but Fracastoro would also profit from Aquinas’s ideas for his theoretical approach 
to the problem of  mythophilia and philosophy, as well as those of  Plotinus. The last 
section of  these pages will discuss it under the label of  mythotherapy, which I will 
use to refer to the set of  tools employed by Renaissance philosophers to develop 
the epistemic power of  wonder in order to surpass the limitations of  (natural) 
philosophy.
Girolamo Fracastoro, a physician, astronomer, poet, and literary critic, played a 
major and frequently neglected role in the history of  admiratio during the Renaissance. 
This role—in its aim and implications—goes well beyond the therapeutical qualities 
of  poetry, as found in the bombastic assertions made by Ficino or Pico at the 
end of  the fifteenth century, or even in the perpetual mythographical tradition of  
Apollo as the god of  both disciplines.31 Fracastoro’s ideas on intellection, found in 
his trilogy on the human mind—Naugerius, Turrius, and Fracastorius—written from 
the 1530s to the 1550s, hint at one of  the reasons why sixteenth-century physicians 
produced such a vast amount and variety of  poetry.
However, before tackling Fracastoro’s treatises on intellection, it is necessary 
to recall his critique of  wonder as found in his Concerning Sympathy and Antipathy. 
Printed in 1546 for the first time by Bernardo Giunta in Venice, Chapter 20 of  
the first book offers a succinct approach to the psychology of  admiratio, which 
31 See Pico, Conclusiones nongentae 7.8 (1998, p. 469, music should be understood here in a classical 
fashion, that is, as music and poetry) and Ficino, Epistles I. 22 (1495, fol. 14r). Together with 
this tradition, a number of  renowned literary commonplaces regarding the relation between 
medicine and poetry survive during the Renaissance, among the most successful being the 
image of  poetry as honey to sweeten the medicine of  knowledge, as found in Lucretius’s De 
rerum natura I, 935–950; IV, 10–25 (cf. Plato, Laws 659e–660a). For a different tradition, sustained 
in consolatory literature as a medicine for the soul, see Cicero’s Tusculan disputations III.1.1, 
III.2.4ff, etc.; Seneca, Consolation to Marcia 1.8; Puttenham 1999, p. 206; etc. For the therapeutics 
of  poetry and music in medieval medical treatises, see, as an introduction, Olson 2005, pp. 
275–287. On the Apollonian character as related to disciplines (prophecy, poetry, music, and 
medicine), see Ficino’s Argumentum et commentaria in Phaedrum 30.6 (2008, pp. 160–161).
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Fracastoro divides into three kinds. The first is clearly linked to Aristotelian 
thaumazein, as found in Metaphysics α: “If  something new is presented as unknown 
and it does not produce the fantasy of  an inconvenient evil, there is no fear, 
just wonder. Wonder is nothing other than the suspension or fixation and careful 
commitment of  the soul.”32 Fracastoro complements this wonder that predisposes 
individuals to philosophical enquiry with a second sort, which he names ecstasy. 
He explains it as follows:
When the unknown is presented in a magnitude that by far exceeds what we are 
accustomed to, in the guise of  something that we revere and love for our own belief, 
there is ecstasy, that is, a certain excess of  the mind and the fantasy in wonder. 
Through ecstasy we become distracted, indifferent, and insensitive to anything 
else. This happens either to those who are truly saints, or to the melancholics.33
The third and last category of  wonder addressed by Fracastoro clearly recalls 
Aquinas’s kataplexis or, for that matter, Descartes’s estonnement, albeit he does not 
give it a name:
When something is presented as admirable, but produces fear, as demons or spirits, 
then affection goes beyond ecstasy and lacks a name, but is defined by its effect, 
horror, as we shiver and become rigid.34
In sum, Fracastoro is interested in wonder insofar as it provides a stimulus 
to actual knowledge. As will be shown, this approach determines his conception 
both of  philosophy and poetry. Ecstasy, though mentioned in other treatises 
of  his, does not contribute to the constitution of  scientific or philosophical 
knowledge and, therefore, will not be included in this discussion.35 Horror—and 
consequently catharsis, compassion, and any plain appeal to the passions—is 
32 “Si vero novum aliquid uti ignotum offeratur, non tamen phantasiam faciens imminentis 
mali, tunc non timor fit, sed admiratio sola. Nihil enim aliud est admiratio, quam suspensio 
animae seu fixio et applicatio intenta,” Fracastoro 2008, p. 138.
33 “Si vero quod offertur uti ignotum sub ratione offeratur cuiusdam magnitudinis consueta 
longe excedentis, sed rei tamen quam per opinionem veneramur et amamus, tunc ecstasis 
vocata fit, hoc est mentis phantasiaeque excessus quidam in admiratione, per quam ab omni 
alia re distracti immotique reddimur, et insensitivi. Quod maxime iis accidit, qui aut vere sancti 
sunt aut sibi ex melancholiis videntur,” Fracastoro 2008, p. 138.
34 “Si vero res sub ratione magnitudinis oblata sit, sed rerum timendarum, ut daemonum 
et manium, tunc affectus supra ecstasim fit, qui nomen non habet, sed ab effectu horror 
appellatur: horrescimus enim et rigidi evadimus,” Fracastoro 2008, p. 138.
35 Fracastoro 2006, pp. 200–202; 1999, p. 90.
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entirely absent from his aesthetics, to the point that he hesitates over including lyric 
and dramatic poetry in the catalogue of  legitimate poetic forms throughout his 
Naugerius [ca. 1540].36 Notwithstanding that it is also mentioned in the Naugerius, 
poetic frenzy is far from easily integrated into his general conception of  poetry, 
nor can Fracastoro’s Neoplatonism be maintained when the remaining titles of  
his trilogy on human mind—Turrius and Fracastorius—are considered as part of  a 
general approach to poetics.
It seems to me that the disputed adscription of  Fracastoro to either 
Neoplatonism or Neo-Aristotelianism with regard to his aesthetics37 has been 
motivated by the fact that scholars, as far as I know, have failed to find the source 
of  his ideas on the relation between poetry and philosophy. While Fracastoro 
is undoubtedly aware of  the passage of  Metaphysics α 2 982b11–2 and of  the 
scholastic and the humanistic traditions as presented above, he complements 
them with another authority to give an original treatment to the problem: the 
book eight (1–2) of  the fifth Ennead of  Plotinus.38 It should be noted, nonetheless, 
that Fracastoro could not be merely making use of  Marsilio Ficino’s rendering 
of  Plotinus, whose editio princeps was published in 1492 and reissued in 1540;39 
rather, he could be employing the pseudoepigraphic version found in the Theologia 
Aristotelis,40 first printed in Rome in 1519 and whose attribution to the Stagirite 
remained disputed during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.41 That being the 
case, Fracastoro would have been incorporating Platonic elements to his aesthetics 
while supposing that he was just further developing Aristotelian premises.
36 Fracastoro 2005, pp. 82–85. See also Muñoz Martín 2004, pp. 341–343.
37 Fracastoro’s anti-Platonic literary criticism has been held by Spingarn 1963, pp. 14–15, 
Bundy 1924, pp. 15, and Weinberg 1961, II, pp. 725–729, although their arguments are founded 
on different grounds. Brann (2002, pp. 300–309) argues in favor of  Fracastoro’s Neoplatonism 
through his treatment of  poetic frenzy, with such reputed antecedents as Patterson 1935, p. 
935 and Moss 1999, pp. 100–101. An intermediate approach in Trabalza 1915, pp. 126 and 
211, Brisca 1950, pp. 545–565, Mazzacurati 1977, esp. pp. 56–7, Peruzzi 2005, pp. 8–11 and 
2006, pp. 217–228, and Chevrolet 2007, pp. 154 and 569–577.
38 Plotinus 1984: 236–249.
39 The passage in Plotinus 1492, sigs. ii10r–kk2r; 1540, fols. 92r–93v. On the editorial fate of  
Plotinus during the Renaissance, see O’Meara 1992, pp. 55–74. For a comprehensive approach 
to the links between Plotinus’s thought and the philosophy of  Fracastoro, see Pennuto 2008.
40 Ps-Aristotle, Theologia sive Mistica philosophia IV. 4. Quanta sit dignitas Mundi Intellectivi et qua 
ratione ad illum perveniatur 1519, sigs. c3r–c4r (fols. 20r–21v). With regard to admiratio, see also 
VI. 2 (sigs. g3r–g4r, fols 28r–29r) and XIV. 15 (sigs. z2r–z3r, fols. 91r–92r).
41 Kraye 1986, pp. 265–286.
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Therefore, in Turrius, his dialogue on epistemology, he recalls not only the 
Aristotelian idea that philosophers—a name he takes for himself—are to admire 
new and great things and to concentrate their research on them, but also that 
they should explore the more hidden and remote causes in order to produce 
an imitation of  the universals.42 This necessity of  moving beyond the common 
knowledge of  things, he states, is the reason why philosophers are prone to 
melancholy.43 However, this paradoxical pleasure is not exclusive to them. Quite 
the contrary, poets are equally accustomed to being seized by greatness and beauty, 
in Fracastoro’s own words:
They [the poets] also voluntarily apprehend the causes behind the things and they 
enjoy them. For this reason, many among the poets were great philosophers and 
many among the philosophers were great poets.44
Still, there is a difference: whereas the philosopher is primarily devoted to 
the study of  causes, the poet remains captivated by the inner beauty of  reality. 
The latter’s love of  things is so intense that if  he happens to find any fault in the 
beauty and elegance of  his object of  contemplation, he corrects it. For Fracastoro, 
this procedure does not lead to considering the poet as a fabricator, as tradition 
dictates. Quite the contrary: the poet becomes a source of  perfection as the 
poem outshines reality. Moreover, this course of  action marks a neat distinction 
between the poet and the philosopher: “Poets experience satisfaction for what 
they conceive (as if  they were giving birth), whereas philosophers prefer to keep 
their conceptions to themselves.”45 As a result, if  we are forced to consider the 
42 These ‘universals’ should not be confused with Platonic ideas. See Fracastoro 2006, pp. 96–102. 
43 “Ergo philosophi natura sunt, qui apte possunt et universalia facere, et observare, non 
publica tantum, sed et abdita quoque: atque in iis maxime gaudent. Qua de causa et admirabundi 
maxime sunt. Admirari enim solemus valde nova, et magna. In abditis autem semper magnitudo 
quaedam est, maior autem in iis, quae nobilia per se sunt, unde et in iis quum potissimum 
gaudeant. Causas etiam eorum solent inquirere, qui philosophi sunt. Atque in hoc praecipue 
natura philosophi est, quod abditorum causas maxime amat perquirere. Propter quod et natura 
cogitabundi sunt, et taciturni, in quibus non nihil potest melancholia,” Fracastoro 2006, p. 236.
44 “Quapropter et ipsi causas rerum libenter discunt, et in iis delectantur. Unde et poetarum multi 
philosophi etiam magni fuere, sicuti et philosophorum multi simul poetae fuere,” Fracastoro 
2006, p. 236.
45 “Unde poetae quasi parere gaudent, philosophi intra tenere foetum,” Fracastoro 2006, p. 
238. And he follows: “Unde philosophi ad sciendum magis nati sunt, minus ad imitandum: 
poetae vero ad imitandum magis. Siqui vero aequaliter ad utrunque sint apti, hi et philosophi 
simul et poetae sunt.”
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possibility of  a poet-philosopher, his thirst for wisdom and his love for imitation 
should be made equal.46
Fracastoro goes one step further in his Naugerius, though it is a previous work. 
In the final pages of  this treatise on poetics, devoted to the utility of  poetry, he 
recreates the arguments contained in Plato’s Ion—i.e., that there is no science in 
poetry, and the poet ultimately is a mere imitator of  other sciences—simply in 
order to allow Navagero, the main character of  the dialogue, to pronounce the 
following passage, centered on the psychological aspects of  learning:
If  some philosopher, using unadorned language, should teach that some mind 
pervades the universe, I should fall in love with this idea as being a noble idea. 
But if  this same philosopher should tell me the same thing in poetic fashion, and 
should say:
Know first, the heaven, the earth, the main
The moon’s pale orb, the starry train
Are nourished by a soul,
A bright intelligence, which darts
Its influence through the several parts
And animates the whole
If, I say, he presents the same thing to me in this way, I shall not only love, but be 
struck with wonder, and I shall feel that a divine something has entered into my soul.47
Navagero introduces two important ideas. On the one hand, wonder 
is not simply a precondition of  actual learning, but rather an instrument that 
can be manipulated to awaken the thirst for knowledge. The poem is not just a 
composition crafted with rhetorical or poetic finesse, but also the aftermath of  
46 This opposition is merely suggested at the end of  the treatise, when Fracastoro poses the 
difference between a ‘pure’ philosopher and a ‘pure’ poet taking Vergil’s Bucolics as an example 
of  poetic frenzy (2006, p. 240). It should be noted that poetic madness is due to nature itself, 
not divine intercession. 
47 Fracastoro 1924, p. 71. For a modern edition of  the text, Fracastoro (2005, p. 102): “Si 
enim philosophus quispiam, nos erudiens, simplici oratione doceat mentem quandam esse per 
omnia diffusam, adamabo quidem rem isthanc, utpote rem magnam edoctus. At vero, si idem 
ille poetico modo eandem mihi rem referat et declaret: Principio coelum ac terras camposque 
liquentes/ lucentemque globum Lunae titaniaque astra/ spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa 
per artus/ mens agitat molem et magno se corpore miscet. [Vergil, Aeneid, VI, 724–727] Si, 
inquam, eandem rem hoc pacto referat mihi, non adamabo solum, sed admirabor et divinum 
nescio quid in animum mihi immissum existimabo.”
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true learning on a given object of  imitation. On the other, the poet, invested with 
this demiurgical role, recreates reality truer than it could possibly be perceived. 
Thus truth, as presented in the poem, does not stem from poetic frenzy or divine 
intercession. On the contrary, it is necessary for the poet to approach his subject 
as a philosopher and to write his composition down with the skills bestowed 
by rhetoric and poetry. This twofold refutation goes even further. As in nature, 
wonder that stems from a poem is nothing but a precondition for accessing 
hidden aspects behind the sensible world.48 And Navagero offers yet another 
argument to prove the superiority of  poetry over philosophy: in its capacity to 
reflect the process of  creation and to appraise the “ideas” behind this process, 
poetry denounces the fallacies in the materiality of  the world and (re)presents its 
chaotic and mutable nature in order. As a result, poetry becomes the only cure—
or, at least, a relief—for the philosopher’s melancholy.
Natural philosophy—medicine included—and poetics are challenged in 
several ways by the theoretical framework provided by Fracastoro. First, wonder 
is common to poetry and philosophy. Nonetheless, whereas in natural philosophy 
it is wonder that moves a person to research the causes of  a given natural 
phenomenon, poetry aims to reproduce the creative processes behind that natural 
event and, by doing so, brings Nature’s perfection to light. This crafted perfection 
constitutes poetic wonder and also responds to Renaissance polemics about Book 
α of  Aristotle’s Metaphysics insofar as Fracastoro’s conception of  poetry forges a 
link between physics and metaphysics.49 Therefore, mimesis serves as a medium 
between the processes that establish the material world and the intellective soul. 
This means that Fracastoro distances himself  both from Pontano’s treatment of  
48 Fracastoro’s comments on this passage by Vergil in the Fracastorius—the last of  his works 
on intellection—offer a neat distinction between the theologian and the philosopher, and 
therefore between poetic frenzy and poetry: “Theologi vero nostri de his exactius et diligentius 
scripserunt. Quod vero et coelestes orbes organica quoque sint corpora manifestum est, 
quoniam idipsa dissimilaribus constant partibus, aliis quidem densioribus, aliis rarioribus, et 
magnitudine et ordine et situ differentibus, verum consensu tanto, tam mira virtute ad certos 
fines et operationes constitutis, ut omnia, quae in universo sunt, corpora inde gubernentur. 
Quae vero eos orbes agitat et regit anima ipsorum est, quam philosophi intelligentiam et 
mentem vocant. Non est autem haec mens mundi anima, sed particularis quaedam natura, 
quae et esse et virtutem recipit a mundi anima, operatur autem secundum illam, quam recepit, 
virtutem,” Fracastoro 1999, p. 94.
49 On the origin of  the problem in the Renaissance, mainly found in the 1527 translation 
of  Alexander of  Aphrodisias’s Commentary on the Metaphysics by Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, see 
Kraye 1991, pp. 137–160.
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poetic admiratio in the Actius—although fundamental to understand his Naugerius—
and from the concept of  mimesis as presented by Plato.50 Second, Fracastoro 
refines Aristotle’s attribution of  melancholy to poets and philosophers in Problem 
30 of  the Physics. For the philosopher, melancholy stems from the inner difficulty 
of  discovering the hidden causes for the multiplicity of  phenomena that compose 
the sensible world. The craft of  a poem aims to provide an explanation for the 
meaning of  the hidden causes through mimesis—a mimesis (as has been stated 
before) that outdoes nature and, as a result, serves as a cure for the philosopher’s 
melancholy. Hence, the triumph of  the poet in healing the philosophers could be 
understood as the victory of  human mind over Nature.
This intellectualized aesthetic partly counters Empedocles’s expulsion from 
Mount Helicon in Aristotle’s Poetics,51 a condemnation also imposed on Lucretius, 
Pontano’s Meteora and Urania, Marullus’s Hymni naturales, and on Fracastoro’s 
Syphilis by sixteenth-century Neo-Aristotelian literary criticism.52 It can hardly 
be denied that, despite its somewhat disordered presentation, Fracastoro offers 
a powerful response derived from both Aristotelian poetics and metaphysics. 
Furthermore, it could be equally argued that Fracastoro’s concerns on this topic 
start as early as 1510, when he begins to compose poetry in the vein of  classical 
scientific masterpieces such as Lucretius’s De rerum natura:
Yet I am hardly unaware of  the difficulties either in describing what heaven 
ordained and how it played out, or in seeking with certainty the causes of  all these 
events: for sometimes heaven achieves its results over many years, and sometimes 
(which can mislead you) chance and varied accidents account for each event.53
50 The English translation of  Pontano’s passage from the Actius devoted to admiratio was 
included as an appendix to Fracastoro’s Naugerius (1924, pp. 75–86). Important discussions 
on Pontano’s conception of  admiratio in the Actius and beyond can be found in Tateo 1972, 
esp. pp. 104–132; Ferraù 1983; Grassi 1984, pp. 135–155, esp. 143–149; Deramaix 1987, pp. 
171–212; and Grassi 1993, pp. 71–78.
51 Aristotle, Poetics I 1447b16–20. See Fracastoro 2005, pp. 64–68 and 91–95 and cf. the 
fragments from Aristotle’s lost dialogues—Sophista (Diogenes Laertius VIII. 2. 53, IX. 5. 
12; Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. VII. 6–7) and De poetis (Diogenes Laertius VIII. 2. 57–8), 
Aristotle 2008, pp. 142 and 522–524—which pose a fundamental problem for the application 
of  Pontano’s ideas on admiratio to Fracastoro’s own praxis.
52 See, for instance, Castelevetro 1978 I: 43, 45, and 254. Cf. Fracastoro’s inclusion from Neo-
Aristotelianism in Scaliger 2003 V, pp. 204ff, or from Neoplatonism in Patrizi 1969–1971, II, 
pp. 160–161 and III, pp. 400–401, 413–414, 437, and 444.
53 “Quamquam animi haud fallor, quid agat quove ordine caelum/dicere et in cunctis certas 
perquirere causas/difficile esse: adeo interdum per tempora longa/effectus trahit, interdum 
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4. summary and conclusIons
Let me summarize the main argument of  this paper. I have attempted to trace 
the evolution of  one of  the more famous passages of  Aristotle’s Metaphysics (α 
982b11–21) from the thirteenth century to the beginning of  the sixteenth century, 
focusing on four different moments: its reception by Thomas Aquinas and his 
contemporaries during the (Latin) thirteenth century, its appropriation by the early 
humanists to defend the preeminence of  poetry, the recovery of  its theoretical 
implications for the history of  poetics and the history of  emotions by a number 
of  Renaissance scholars in the decade of  the 1490s, and its radical transformation 
in the hands of  a physician and humanist like Girolamo Fracastoro.
As I have shown, the apparent simplicity of  the passage, where Aristotle merely 
mentions that the ancient philosophers were also lovers of  myths (philomythi), as 
wonder was common among them, had an impressive potential to tackle some 
of  the fundamental issues of  poetics during at least four centuries. During 
the thirteenth century, it served to establish a theory of  wonder (admiratio), an 
archaeology of  poetry, to present the subaltern role of  poetry to philosophy—and, 
therefore, to justify the place of  poetry among the system of  arts—, to establish 
a neat distinction between the revealed poetry of  the Bible and the poetry of  
the pagans, etc. In the fourteenth century, it was used for the opposite purposes 
by humanists, because they understood that Aristotle was affirming that poetry 
was the very origin of  philosophy and theology, and therefore, that there was 
something divine in it and, as such, that it should be considered not as an ancillary 
discipline but as the pinnacle of  all of  them. As I have explained, this lead to a 
theoretical impoverishment of  the passage and somehow Platonized Aristotle’s 
conception of  poetry. With a number of  exceptions, between the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries this was the predominant reading of  Aristotle’s passage on the 
philomythos. As I have argued, between the 1480s and 1490s the situation radically 
changed in Italy, most probably thanks to the recovery of  the Greek manuscript 
of  Aristotle’s Poetics.
As is known, Aristotle’s Poetics offers a perspective on poetry very distant from 
Platonic assumptions and even more so from the Neoplatonic defense of  poetry’s 
divine character; so humanists, or at least a number of  them, started to reflect on 
(quod fallere possit)/miscentur fors [sic., read “sors”] et varii per singula casus,” Syphilis I. 
256–60, Fracastoro 2013, pp. 16–19. See the comments on the passage in Haskell 2007, pp. 
191–192, and see also the poorly cited and studied fragment of  Fracastoro’s letter on his 
Syphilis 1955, pp. 25–34, which provides further support to the thesis presented in these pages.
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the meaning of  wonder (admiratio) and myth (fabula) in the passage of  the Metaphysics 
with differing aims. Some tried to justify the power of  fiction as a philosophical 
device, some to claim that poetry should be simply a tool for instruction in other 
disciplines, some to approach the psychology of  fiction, some to argue for the 
production of  scientific poetry, and some to play with fundamental concepts in 
their field of  expertise. This was the case of  physicians such as Galeotto Marzio, 
humanists such as Pontano, philologists such as Poliziano, rhetoricians such as 
Antonio Urceo, and, some time later, theologians such as Erasmus. What seems 
appealing to me is that all their reflections and practices on fiction can be analyzed 
and at least partially explained in the tradition of  interpretations of  Metaphysics 
982b11–21.
As their responses to the problem manifested themselves in very different 
formats and with very different results, I have focused on chapter 21 of  Marzio’s 
De disciplina promiscua and Pontano’s Actius. The two texts defend almost opposite 
positions: Marzio uses Aristotle’s mention of  the philomythos to discuss avant la lettre 
the physiology and psychology of  literature—that is, its reception as a possibility 
for its definition. Pontano’s efforts are focused on offering a definition of  poetry as 
a discipline based upon the excellence of  its form—a standpoint greatly supported 
by sixteenth-century poetics—, on differentiating poetry from any other genre of  
discourse and on defining which kind of  wonder poetry should awake.
I chose both Marzio and Pontano, and spent some time explaining Aquinas’s 
approach, as they offer the background to Fracastoro’s treatment of  the problems 
posed by Metaphysics 982b11–21. As I have discussed and stressed, Fracastoro 
presents a very original slant on the problem thanks to his use of  Plotinus’s 
Enneads as a complementary source, as he argues for a symbiosis between the poet 
and the philosopher with regard to wonder. His standpoint on the problem is 
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appendIx
Galeotto Marzio, De doctrina promiscua [ante 1490, princeps 1548]1
|[174] De philosophis, qui viventes sunt mortui. Cap. XX.
[…]
|[183] Mortuus ergo Palemon ex viuente factus illecebras corporis abiiciens, 
quae sunt philosophorum secutus est. Hi enim, vitae inspectiuae addicti, vbi aliquid 
considerandum est speculantur, vnde in prima philosophia dicitur: “Philosophum 
quodammodo amatorem esse fabularum, ex miris nanque constant.” Admiratio 
igitur philosophum ad rerum contemplationem inuitat. Hinc est quod fabularum, 
vbi admiranda ponuntur, est quodammodo, vt diximus, amicus sapiens, quem 
mortuum esse dudum ostendimus.
|[184] De multis generibus fabularum etiam verarum, et cur fabulae varia 
operentur in homine et quae constellatio faciat amatores fabularum. 
Cap. XXI.
1. Fabulam Cicero Ad Herennium2 finit eam quae nec vera nec verisimilis est, 
ex cuius sermone comprendimus fabularum aliam non veram, ut comoediae et 
tragoediae, et aliam non verisimilem,3 ut homo in leonem lupumue conuersus.4 
Co- |[185]moedias5 autem fabulas dici Terentius testatur, cum ait: “Populo vt 
placerunt,6 quas fecisset fabulas.”7 Sed in his et tragoediis non verisimilitudo, sed 
veritas deest, ficta enim narrantur; et in conuersione hominis in bestias aliasue 
res veri similitudo abest, cum veritas subesse possit, Sacra enim historia vxorem 
Lot in statuam salis versam esse commemorat. Ita vt secundum Ciceronem, et 
quosdam doctrina ingenioque praestantes, fabularum nomine contineantur, quae 
vera aliquando fuerunt, hoc nominis fortita, quoniam abest verisimile.
2. Narratio oratoris non constituit8 verum, non verisimile, vnde dicitur 
narrationem esse oportere veram, aut verisimilem; ita tamen, vt quod verum est, 
etiam verisimile appareat, cum verisimile ei sit satis absque vero; ex verisimili nanque 
nascitur credulitas, id est, persuasio, et haec est vna fabulae acceptio:9 ita vt sit 
fabulosa res vera non verisimilis, et eodem modo appelletur res verisimilis, non vera; 
in altero veri similitudo, altero autem veritas deficientes fabulae nomen formant.10 
Fabula etiam pro eo accipitur, quod homines aut fantur aut fabulantur. Iuuenalis: 
“It noua nec tristis per cunctas fabula coenas.”11 Et cum huiusmodi in omni actione 
paratam fa- |[186] bulam affirmet Plinius, de eo quod rumoribus disseminatur 
intelligit. Sic etiam Suetonius in Augusto, “Coena quoque eius secretior in fabulis 
fuit”,12 ita vt huiusmodi fabulae non sint veritatis penitus expertes.
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appendIx
Galeotto Marzio, On Many Different Affairs [ante 1490, princeps 1548]
|[174] On philosophers, who, while living, are dead. Chapter 20.
[…]
|[183] Therefore, Polemon, made dead in life, despised the charms of  the body 
and followed all that is proper for philosophers. When these men, consecrated to the 
speculative life, find something worthy of  consideration, they study it. Therefore, 
as it is said in the First Philosophy: “The philosopher is, in a certain way, a lover of  
fables, because they consist of  wonder.” Consequently, it is wonder that invites the 
philosopher to contemplation. This is the reason why the wise man—whom we 
already proved to be dead—is in a certain way, as we said, a lover of  fables, where the 
things worthy of  admiration are deposited.
|[184] On the many kinds of fables and on the true ones, and why they affect men 
differently, and what constellation makes men lovers of fables. Chapter 21.
1. Cicero in the Rhetoric to C. Herennius defines a fable as that which is neither true 
nor plausible, and from these words we understand that some fables, such as comedies 
and tragedies, are not true, while others, as when a man is transformed into a lion or a 
wolf, are not plausible. And that comedies are called fables is attested by Terence when 
he says: “He made these fables in order to please the people.” In these and in tragedies 
there is not a lack of  verisimilitude, but rather of  truth, because fictitious things are 
told; and in the transformation of  men into beasts and other similar things, although 
verisimilitude is lacking, they can contain an underlying truth, for Sacred history tells us 
that Lot’s wife was turned into a pillar of  salt. So, according to Cicero and some other 
excellent men both in doctrine and ingenuity, things that truly happened are enclosed 
under the name of  “fables,” and they receive this name because they lack verisimilitude.
2. The narrative [narratio] of  an orator establishes neither truth nor verisimilitude; 
hence it is said that a narrative needs to be either true or plausible, yet in such a way 
that what is true is seen to be plausible, while it is enough for it to be plausible without 
being true. Credulity—that is, persuasion—is the daughter of  verisimilitude and this 
is a way to understand the word “fable”: as something fabulous that happens to be 
true and not plausible, and likewise as something plausible which is untrue; lacking 
verisimilitude in the former, and truth in the latter, both can be said to be a “fable.” 
“Fable” refers also to what men say or chatter, [as in] Juvenal: “The untragic news 
[noua… fabula] passes round all the dinner parties.” And when Pliny states that there 
is a fable in all action, he understands that every action is divulged by rumors, as 
Suetonius does in his Life of  Augustus: “There were also stories [fabulis] about a rather 
secret dinner he arranged;” consequently, fables are not completely untrue.
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3. Sed ea fabula, vt supra diximus, cuius amici sunt philosophi, ex miris 
constat, et mira vnunquenque in sui cognitionem rapiunt, quod est sapientiae 
principium; horum nanque auiditate allecti, ad perscrutandas causas rerum se 
conuerterunt.13 Vnum tamen non est obliuioni tradendum, etiam fabulas quae 
videntur commentitiae in religione antiquorum vim sincerae veritatis habere. 
Dicente Plinio decimo sexto Naturalis historiae smilacem14 “infaustam esse in 
sacris omnibus et coronis, quoniam sit lugubris virgine eius nominis per amorem 
iuuenis Croci mutata in hunc fruticem: id vulgus ignorans plerunque festa sua 
polluit, heredam15 existimando.”16 Huiusmodi autem fabularum, quae comentitiae 
sunt, amatores maxime videntur hi, in quorum genitura Luna dominatur cum 
Mercurio infortunato,17 vt mathematici afferunt.18 Sed illud Ciceronis in tertio 
De natura deorum, cum Zenonis, Cleanthis, Chrysippique philosophorum in 
reddenda ratione commentitiarum fabularum curam mo- |[187] lestam ac minime 
necessariam narret, expostulare videtur vt haec eadem tela in eum retorqueamus, 
cum haec Ciceronis cura de cura philosophorum minime sit necessaria.19 Nam 
in rebus omnibus, et maxime sacris, si velatarum rerum explicatio negligatur, 
plurima quae mystica sunt ridicula putabuntur. Et ne hac in re tempus teramus, 
satis erit hoc adduxisse quod in libro Geneseos est: “Et audiuit Adam vocem Dei 
deambulans ad auram post meridiem”20 quod, si ita vt sonat intelligatur, esset 
profecto ridendum.21 Sed haec diuina ex sententia Thomae necesse est aliquo 
humanitatis radio vestiantur vt compraehendi possint,22 vnde maximam laudem 
Zeno, Cleanthes, et Chrysippus merentur, qui laborarunt vt in lucem venirent 
quae sub vestimento fabuloso latitarunt.23
4. Fabula igitur cum multifariam accipiatur, inter medicos tamen in vna tantum 
significatione versatur. Prima enim quarti Auicenna ad somni conciliationem 
leuationes vocum cum fabulis faciendis narrat.24 Et apud Suetonium in Vita 
Augusti legitur si interruptum somnum recuperare vt euenit non posset, lectoribus, 
aut fabulatoribus accersitis resumebat.25 Fabulas ergo pro narrationibus siue fictis 
siue veris ponit, ac si dice- |[188] ret locutiones, narrationesue, aut historiarum, 
aut aliarum rerum hoc efficiunt. Hoc autem non est leuiter pertranseundum, 
quandoquidem problema Aristotelicum inquirit, cur est quod ex fabulis alii 
resoluuntur in somnum, alii autem dormitantes excitantur.26 Plurimi enim vt 
somnum fugiant, legere incipiunt, et alii vigilantes cum legere incipiunt dormitant, 
et vt de lectione, sic de auditione contingit. Nam in homiliis27 saepe accidit, vt 
praedicantis oratio alios28 sopiat, excitet alios, huius autem tam diuersi affectus 
audientium legentiumue habitudo varia causam praestat.
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3. But the fable we mentioned above, that is, the one that philosophers love, 
consists of  wonder, and wonders draw every single one of  them into their knowledge, 
which is the principle of  wisdom; for men, enticed by desire, become inclined to 
find the causes of  things. It should not be forgotten that even the fables that seem 
capriciously forged in the religion of  the ancients have the force of  unvarnished truth. 
As Pliny comments in the sixteenth book of  his Natural History: “It is unlucky to use 
smilax in any sacred rites or for wreaths, because it has a mournful association—a 
maiden of  the same name as the plant was turned into this shrub because of  her 
love for a youth named Crocus; this the common people ignore and usually pollute 
their festivals with it, because they think it is ivy.” It seems that those who take more 
pleasure in fables of  this kind—which are inventions—are those in whose geniture 
the moon is ruled with an unfortunate Mercury, as astrologers attest. But when, in the 
third book of  On the Nature of  the Gods, Cicero refers to the attention of  philosophers 
such as Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus in explaining these forged fables, he says it is 
annoying and wholly unnecessary; but this seems to require that we turn the same darts 
back on him, as his brooding on the philosophers’ pensiveness is equally pointless. 
Because in all matters, and especially in those that are sacred, if  the explanation of  
veiled things is despised, most of  them, which are mysterious, would be thought 
laughable. And, to avoid wasting more time on this, it will suffice to recall what is 
written in the book of  Genesis: “And Adam heard the voice of  the Lord walking in 
the garden in the evening.” This, understood the way it sounds, would be laughable. 
But these divine matters, according to Thomas Aquinas, need to be dressed in some 
glimmer of  humanity in order to be apprehended, and therefore Zeno, Cleanthes, and 
Chrysippus deserve the utmost praise, as they worked to shed light on those things 
which were hidden under the guise of  fable.
4. Although the term “fable” has multiple acceptations, among physicians it is 
understood univocally. In the first of  the fourth of  his Canon, Ibn Sina says that 
making fables aloud helps one go to sleep. And in Suetonius, in the Life of  Augustus, 
we read that when he could not go back to sleep after awakening, as happened, he 
sent for readers and story-tellers. Fables, therefore, are understood as narrations 
either fictional or true, as if  he would have said that speeches or stories about either 
historical events or other matters, produce [the desired effect]. And this issue is far 
from trivial, as Aristotle in one of  his Problems enquires into the reason why there are 
people who fall asleep when they listen to fables, and why others are roused from 
drowsiness by the same. For this reason, there are many who start reading to avoid 
sleep, and others who, as they start to read in a wakeful state, doze off; and this applies 
both to reading and listening. With homilies it happens frequently that the preacher’s 
sermon lulls some to sleep and rouses others, and the disposition of  the audience or 
readers is the reason for such a different response.
Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica, vol. 4, n.º 2 (2017): 163-214
Jorge Ledo202
5. Alii enim sunt qui cerebrum pituita humoribusque crudis repletum habent, 
vel melancholicos ac frigidos, tam euaporationi quam inflationi obnoxios, eodem 
in loco tenent. Et tales viri sine stimulis cogitationum facile vigilant. In vigilia 
autem calor humanus foris versatur, et propter hanc causam, illos tam crudos 
tamque frigidos vapores mouere non potest, nimis enim ab his distat. Sed cum 
legere aut audire fabulas incipiunt motus in spiritibus et in calore ventriculorum 
cerebri necessario fiunt, horum autem motuum, causa est ipsa cogitatio.29 Ex 
illo igitur et spirituum et caloris cerebri congeminato calo- |[189] re illius tam 
crudae tamque frigidae massae sint quaedam euaporatio, quam ob causam spiritus 
illi cerebri ventriculos obsidentes crassescunt, et crassitudo motum caloremque 
ipsorum impedit, ita vt iam nequeant ad exteriora diuerti, quae res vigiliam faceret, 
sed infrigidati intus remanent, et hoc dormitionis est causa. Huiusmodi igitur 
naturae viri, quorum cerebella talibus grauantur, reuocato ad interiora calore, quod 
somnum facit, ex lectione auditioneue fabularum resoluuntur in somnum. Sed in 
aliis qui diuerso se habent modo, e contrario propter diuersitatem naturae accidit. 
Nam si auditor lectorue fabularum aut librorum in cerebro habuerit materiam 
biliosam acutam, euaporationi idoneam atque aptam, cito enim labitur, quam 
cogitatio mouet, statim pulso ad exteriora calore, vigilabit et dormitans excitabitur. 
Calor duplicatus in illis superioribus cruditate ac ineptitudine irretitus minime 
valens foras prosilire somniculosum fecit; et in his propter facilem agilemque 
materiam, concitatus calor exteriora petens, vigilem reddidit. Et hoc pacto pro 
diuersitate naturae auditio aut lectio diuersa operatur.
6. Praeterea haec varietas nascitur ex inaequalitate intellectuum. Nam qui 
hebeti ingenio |[190] crassaque Minerua vtuntur, cum quae leguntur aut narrantur 
non intelligunt, et acutissimi quoque cum etiam lecta aut audita non percipiunt cum 
hebetioribus concordantes in hoc duntaxat, quia et ipsi quoque non intelligunt, 
obdormiscunt, nisi essent aliqui tardi, et non obtusi ingenii. Nam de his alia 
ratio est, vt declarabimus. Causa autem huius dormitationis est, quoniam non 
intelligentes tristitia afficiuntur, et haec infrigidat, hic est quod calor extrinsecus, vt 
subueniat infrigidationi intrinsecae ad interiora decurrit, et huiusmodi dispositio 
somnum creat, ideo dormiendo melius concoquimus, calore ad interiora reuocato. 
Est etiam alia causa, nam in legentibus et audientibus fit duplex motus, animae 
scilicet et corporis. Motus siquidem animae est cogitatio, corporis vero motus est ex 
vaporibus et tenuibus humiditatibus per capitis portiones diffusis, quae mouentur 
cursitantibus spiritibus, cursitant autem in actu cogitationis. Cum lector aut auditor 
ingenii obtusi30 est, non habet spiritus suos in motu, quoniam eorum mobilitas 
hominem solertis ingenii effecisset. Hoc autem accidit quia motae humiditates 
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5. There are others who have their brains full of  phlegm, and thick or melancholic 
and cold humors, subject both to evaporation and inflammation. And such men easily 
keep awake without intellectual stimulus. During wakefulness human heat is lost, and 
precisely because of  this, it cannot move vapors that are so thick and cold, because it 
is far from them. But, as soon as these men start reading or listening to fables, their 
spirits start to move, and they get the necessary heat in the ventricles of  their brain; 
and the reason behind these movements is thinking itself. Thus, the double heat from 
the spirits and from the brain produces a certain evaporation of  that thick and cold 
matter, and for this reason those spirits around the ventricles of  the brain expand, 
and their expansion traps both their movement and their heat, in such a way that they 
cannot now leave—a situation that would cause wakefulness—and they remain inside 
within the cooled areas, and this causes somnolence. Therefore, men of  such a nature, 
who have their cerebella burdened with such things, fall asleep because of  reading or 
listening to fables, having regained inside their brain the heat that produces somnolence. 
But those with a different disposition—such is the diversity of  nature—experience the 
contrary effect. For if  one who listens to or reads fables or books has his brain filled 
with a keen, bilious substance, suitable and apt for evaporation, which flows quickly as it 
is moved by reasoning, when the heat is immediately expelled to the outer parts, he will 
stay awake, and the drowsy person will be roused. In the former case, the double heat 
trapped due to their [mental] constipation and to the impossibility of  it leaving the body 
provokes drowsiness; and, in the latter, whose substances move rapidly and easily, as the 
heat is pushed to the exterior parts of  the body they keep awake. And thus reading and 
listening act differently according to the diversity of  nature.
6. Moreover, this diversity is [also] born from the inequality of  intellects. Both 
those dull and ill-educated and those sharp-witted coincide at least in one thing: 
when they don’t understand what is read or told to them, they slumber, even if  
they are not dull or obtuse. For this there is another cause, as we shall declare: as 
they don’t understand, they feel sorrow, and sorrow cools them down. So extrinsic 
heat runs down to the inner parts of  the body to relieve the intrinsic chilliness, and 
this disposition causes drowsiness; for this reason, when we sleep we digest better, 
because heat has retired to the inner parts of  the body. There is yet another cause, 
for in those who read and listen there is a dual motion, that is, a movement of  the 
soul and a movement of  the body. The movement of  the soul is thinking; that of  the 
body stems from vapors and thin moistures spread throughout the regions of  the 
head which are moved when spirits move, that is, in the act of  thinking. When the 
reader or the listener is dull-witted, he has not his spirits in motion, as their mobility 
would have made him intelligent. This happens because the moistures become thicker 
as they move, as we said above, blocking and restraining the force of  the spirits, 
hence follows inaction; but the inaction and immobility of  the spirits is accompanied 
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redduntur crassiores, vt supra diximus, vim spirituum irretientes ac mollientes, vn- 
|[191] de sequitur quies, quietem autem et immobilitatem spirituum aut morbus 
comitialis aut attonitio aut mors aut somnus comitantur. Auditores vero et lectores 
solertes, intelligentes, laetantur, l[a]etitia est causa vigiliae et excitationis, laetatur 
nanque humana natura cum habere intelligit quae sibi conueniunt, conuenit enim 
naturae humanae vigilatio, nam dormitio est quaedam mors, hinc illud poeticum: 
“dulcis et alta quies placidaeque simillima morti.”31
7. Accedit etiam ad hoc quod in homine acutioris ingenii motus cogitationis 
mouet spiritus, ac stimulat ita, vt acriter et saepe excitet et roborat, adeo vt a 
vaporibus opprimi non possint, sicuti accidit in hebetibus et obtusis, in quibus32 
spiritus irretiunaur. Sed quoniam de tardo mentionem fecimus, necesse est aliquid 
in medium adducamus. Continget aliquando vt lector auditorue non obtusi33 aut 
hebetis ingenii, sed tardi sit, vt legitur de Catone: nam tarditas ingenii sapientiae 
adscribitur, non enim statim acquiescit his quae narrantur, et propterea non 
apprehendit. Is igitur qui tardo est ingenio, cum audit aut legit non percipiens 
contristatur, ita enim natura porrigit, omnes enim homines natura scire desiderant. 
Cum igitur quae natura desiderat |[192] assequi non potest, doleat ac tristetur 
necesse est sicuti omnibus in reb. desideratis et non habitis euenit. Tristatur 
ergo et non dormitati, mmo auiditas sciendi illam tristitiam in stimulos quosdam 
vigiliarum exacuit. Nam appetitus perfectionis—scientia enim perficit—animam 
magis ad vigiliam incitat, quia se bestiis non praestare, dedecus cum ignominia 
maximum esse ducit. Timor autem dedecoris et infamiae acuit et inflammat, ita 
vt omnis inertia secordiaque excludatur, vt ad ea, quae dudum percipere nequiuit, 
capescenda promptior paratusque34 sit. Et talia hominibus tardis grauissimas curas 
ac solicitudines35 iniiciunt, qua non modo excitant, sed aduersos ac penitus alienos 
a somno homines reddunt.
8. Tristitia enim dupliciter in nobis operatur, si de praeteritis est, soluit in 
somnum, si autem de futuris erit, excitat. Timor enim ille qui tristitiam creat, propter 
ignominiam aut infamiam futuram insomnes penitus reddens, vt solertius caueant 
efficit. Timere autem honoris amissionem est actus prudentiae, et hoc pacto vt 
diximus de tardis alia ratio fuit. Sed propter haec quae narrauimus fortassis nonnulli 
acclamabunt saepenumero contigisse doctissimos acutissimosque viros ex lectione 
aut auditione non |[193] lassitudine aliqua, nam hoc cuique contingere potest, vt 
defatigatus dormiat; sed eorum natura fuisse in somnum resolutos, quod verum 
esse fatemur. Sed hoc in sapientibus36 et acutis duobus modis potest contingere: vel 
quia iam ad finem talem deuentum est, vt reliqua ex se pateant, et hoc modo calor 
ad interiora tendens, illos in sommum resoluit aut quia docti viri ingenium eiusmodi 
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by either epilepsy, stupor, death, or sleep. On the other hand, bright and intelligent 
readers and listeners rejoice, and joy is a cause of  wakefulness and arousal, because 
human nature takes joy when it understands that it possesses the things that are good 
for it, and wakefulness is good for human nature, because sleep is a sort of  death, 
hence the verse: “Deep and delightful stillness, resembling the stillness of  dead men.”
7. To this it must be added that, in a more sharp-witted man, the movement of  
thinking puts his spirits in motion, and stimulates the spirits in such a way that they 
are sharply and frequently excited and invigorated so they cannot be subjugated by 
the vapors, as happens in the dull and slow-witted, whose spirits remain trapped. But, 
because we have mentioned the slow-witted, it is necessary to make an insertion here. 
It will happen at some time or other that the reader or hearer will be, not obtuse or 
dull, but slow, as we read about Cato, because slowness of  wit is ascribed to wisdom, 
since as wisdom does not immediately acquiesce in what it is told, and therefore does 
not grasp it. Thus, this man who is slow of  wit, not understanding as he hears or 
reads, is saddened—nature is present to such an extent, that all men by nature desire 
to know. And when nature cannot achieve what she desires, perforce she suffers and 
becomes sad, as happens to all men when they desire something and don’t attain it. 
She becomes sad and incapable of  sleep, and the desire to know sharpens that sorrow 
in the stimulus of  wakefulness. Therefore, the appetite for perfection—as science 
makes men perfect—entices the soul to stay awake, because not to surpass the beasts 
is a great dishonor and shame for her. And the fear of  dishonor and disgrace has a 
sharpening and inflaming effect, so that all unskillfulness and dullness are excluded, 
with the aim that she will be faster and ready to understand that which shortly before 
she was unable to learn. And such things cast on the slow-witted the most burdensome 
worries and anxieties, which not only rouses them, but makes men adverse and wholly 
alien to sleep.
8. Sorrow, therefore, operates on us in two different ways. If  it stems from past 
things, it moves us to sleep; if  its origin relies on future affairs, we will be excited into 
wakefulness. Because that fear that produces sorrow, by rendering them sleepless on 
account of  future ignominy or infamy, causes them to be diligently on their guard. 
And to fear a loss of  honor is an act of  prudence, and in this regard, as we have 
already said, the slow-witted have a different condition. But, with regard to the things 
said, perhaps some will claim that the most educated and sharp-witted men have fallen 
asleep reading or hearing [fables], not from a certain weariness—for it is possible 
for anyone to sleep from exhaustion—but that their nature has put them to sleep, 
which we confess to be true. But this can happen to the wise and sharp-witted in two 
different ways. Either because they have arrived at such an end-point that the rest of  
the issues [under consideration] are understandable by themselves, and in this case 
heat moves to their inner parts and leads them to sleep, or because the temperament 
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est, vt etiam tota rei materia intellecta quosdam nodos secum iterum atque iterum 
reuoluendo, omniaque solertissime contemplando defatigatum multos ex spiritibus 
consumpsit. Acerrima enim mentis agitatio et rerum arduarum discursus spiritum 
resoluit, resolutionem cuius quies cum somno sequitur, natura enim defatigata 
quietem quaerit vt eos quos amisit spiritus recuperet instaurationemque faciat, 
dormitio enim quieta spirituum creatrix materque est.
9. In his tamen omnibus ante narratis et somnus et vigilia possunt contigere 
ex modis seruatis in lectione aut auditione fabularum, nam si semper eadem in 
fabulis, eodemque tenore repetantur, nulli dubium est, vel tedium vnde dormitatio, 
vel risio ex qua vigilia in medium prosiliat necesse esse. Horatius: “Male si mandata 
loqueris,/ aut dormitabo aut ridebo.”37 Nam |[194] in tali pronunciatione, est 
quaedam quies, quae somnum imitatur; nisi agitatio irrisionis excutiat, varietas enim 
fabularum et in ipsa pronunciatione et materiae diuersitate nec non in inflexione 
vocum et harmoniae aut soporandi aut excitandi, vis est quae enim ad risum 
aut misericordiam aut ad iram inseruntur, animum in diuersa distrahunt. Ita vt 
affectibus concitatis audiens aut lectitans necessario vigilet, nisi diuturnitas laboris 
auida quietis, nimia resolutione spirituum resoluatur in somnum, sed in audiente 
pro diuersitate naturae somnus aut vigilia nascitur, cum lectitans carminis labore, 
et vocum difficultate vigilet tantum, nisi langore vincatur.38 Ex his igitur nouimus, 
lectione aut auditione fabularum pro habitudinis diuersitate in hominibus diuersa 
contingere, de his hactenus.
10. Nunc ad illa me conuertam quae poetae narrarunt fabulae siquidem 
poetarum aliquando meram ac nudam historiam sine figmento referunt, vt de 
Ceneo39 et Iphide40 mutatis Ouidius loquitur. Plerunque naturalia inserunt, vbi 
veritas simplex apponitur, vt idem XV. Metamorphoseos41:
Clitorio42 quicunque sitim de fonte leuauit, 
Vina fugit gaudetque meris abstemius vndis,
et de tineis agrestibus et aliis huiusmodi, vt ipse et Vir- |[195] gilius in Georgicis 
factitarunt, quaedam vero sub velamento tractantur, quae historiae faciem habentia, 
aliud sub veste occulunt. Et inter caetera illud Martis et Veneris,43 indicio Solis in 
adulterio retibus Vulcani deprehensorum abstrusam mathesim continet, fuerunt 
nanque ab omnibus conspecti vt “haec fuit in toto notissima fabula coelo indicat.”44 
Haec igitur fabula ex intimis matheseos penetralibus originem trahit. Nam adulterum, 
qui publica poena plectitur, facit Martis Venerisque coniunctio in Tauro,45 et haec est 
illa ficta concatenatio, ex Tauro Venus in Leonem mittit antiscium, 46 Leo est Solis 
domicilium et signum igneum, et hinc Solis indicium et opera Vulcani, quae retia 
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of  a wise man is such that even if  he fully understands the issue under consideration, 
going over it again and again raises some knotty points, and so, considering everything 
with utmost skill, he becomes exhausted due to the consumption of  many of  his 
spirits. Therefore, the keenest agitation of  the mind and the running to and fro over 
exhausting matters release the spirit, and quietness with sleep follows its release, as 
nature when it is exhausted seeks quietness so that the lost spirits may be recovered 
and renewed, for a peaceful sleep is the creator and mother of  spirits.
9. Nonetheless in all these things we previously said, not only sleep but also 
wakefulness can have a place in the patterns [of  speech] observed in reading or 
listening to fables. For if  one always repeats the same things in fables, and with the 
same tone, they undoubtedly would lead either to tedium, and consequently to sleep; 
or to laughter, and therefore to wakefulness. Horace says: “If  your speeches are out of  
harmony with your feelings, I shall either fall asleep or burst out laughing.” Because 
in such declamation there is some quietness that imitates sleep; unless the agitation of  
laughter casts him out, or the diversity of  fables and their varied delivery and topics, 
along with vocal inflection and harmony move him to sleep or to excitement, it is 
necessary that they move him to laughter, compassion or anger, and draw the soul in 
different directions. And, once the listener’s or reader’s affections have been aroused, 
he will necessarily be awake, unless a lengthy work-day, eager for quietness, does not 
lead to sleep for the release of  the spirits. But drowsiness or wakefulness in the listener 
arises from a difference in natures; but the reader, due to the fatigue in his delivery and 
the difficulty of  the speeches, would keep awake only if  he had not been defeated by 
fatigue. From this we know that reading or listening to a fable has different effects on 
men according to the differences in their dispositions—enough about this.
10. Now I will turn my attention to those things told by the poets, since indeed poetic 
fables do sometimes recount mere, bare history without fiction, as Ovid does with the 
transformations of  Ceneus and Iphide. Most of  the time they introduce natural things 
not far removed from where the simple truth lies, as in Book 15 of  the Metamorphoses:
Whoever slakes his thirst from Clitor’s spring, 
shuns the wine-cup and abstemiously enjoys pure water only,
and on the silkworms and on other similar things, as he himself  and Virgil in the 
Georgics did. Some are treated in veiled fashion; having the appearance of  history, 
they hide something different under their garment. And among [many] others is that 
of  Mars and Venus, who were caught in adultery by Vulcan thanks to the disclosure 
of  the Sun, trapped in a net and displayed to everybody, so that “the tale [fabula] was 
long most noted in the courts of  Heaven.” This fable finds its origin in the innermost 
secrets of  the astrologers [matheseos]. For adultery, which is punished publicly, is 
represented by the conjunction of  Mars and Venus in Taurus, and this is the fictitious 
sequence: from Taurus, Venus sent the antiscium to the Lion, the Lion is the home 
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fecerunt. Vulcanus enim ignem significat, vnde coitus Martis et Veneris in Tauro, 
vbi Luna exaltatur, amantium complexum effecit, quem poetae finxerunt. Laqueus 
vero et retia sunt Veneris antiscia in signum igneum iacta, et huius adulterii index 
Sol; nam Leo calidus antiscio Veneris inflammatus, simile enim simili additum 
facit furere, hoc adulterium publicauit. Domus enim Solis Leo qui cum de trigono 
igneo47 sit Vulcanum retia machinantem sub figmento continet, et hoc pacto 
totius mali causa in Solem reiicitur, a domici- |[195] lio enim eius deprehensio et 
publicatio adulterii manauerunt.48
11. Sed de Argo qui ob singularem prudentiam centum oculos habuisse 
traditur, fabula manifestam habet historiam: victus enim rex Argus, et occisus est a 
rege Mercurio qui Trismegistus hoc est ter maximus dictus est, fuit enim summus 
philosophus, summusque sacerdos, et denique rex summos. Is enim Aegyptiorum 
ordo erat, vt ex philosophis sacerdotes, et ex sacerdotibus reges eligerent, et in 
his omnibus Trismegistus obtinuit49 principatum, et hinc ter maximus, vt Lactantii 
verbo vtamur.50 Dictus est sopitum dulcedine harmoniae fabula refert, vt Trismegisti 
Mercurii vaframentis delinitum prius, postea occisum Argum ostendat.
12. Sed antiquitas fabulamentis plurimum oblectata est. Sunt enim res poetice 
vt quaedam pictura, teste Flacco:
Vt pictura poesis erit…51
et
… Pictoribus atque poetis 
quidlibet audendi semper fuit aequa potestas.52
In poemate ergo fictio vt pictura potestatem habet, pictura autem teste 
philosopho in Politicis, inuenta est pro rudioribus.53 In poemate sunt et sensa 
abstrusa et facies picta; pictura rudibus excogitata est. Nam in praelio multa 
hominum milia vario caedis genere vir sapiens ex se coniectat, qui rudis est nisi 
haec |[197] picta videat, non intelligit. Vnde pictores et ruentes equos et calcatos 
perfossosque homines, et fugientes alios, alios vero insequentes cum pingunt, 
rudibus satisfaciunt, qui haec coniectare nequiuerant. Sed ex rebus fictis et pictis 
sensa elicere, hoc es sapientis opus, et ob hanc causam philosophos fabularum 
amatores testimonio Aristotelis praedicauimus, et hoc modo ars poetica et doctis 
et indoctis perutilis est.
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of  the Sun and a fire sign, and hence is the indication of  the Sun and the works of  
Vulcan which made the net. Vulcan means fire, from which the coitus of  Mars and 
Venus in Taurus, when the Moon is in the ascendant, causes the embrace of  lovers, as 
the poets write. The trap and the nets are Venus’s antiscia cast into the fire sign, and 
the Sun is the indicator of  this adultery, because the warm Lion, inflamed by Venus’s 
antiscium—for like added to like leads to rage—, made this adultery public. For the 
Sun’s house [i.e., its zodiacal sign] is Leo which, being from the fire trigon, figuratively 
contains the nets of  the skillful Vulcan; and thus the reason for such great mischief  is 
founded in the Sun, because the discovery [of  the lovers] and the publication of  their 
adultery flowed from his house.
11. But also concerning Argos, of  whom it is said that he had a hundred eyes 
on account of  his singular prudence, the fable contains a true history, because Argos 
was a king defeated and killed by the king Mercury, who was called Trismegistus, 
i.e., ‘thrice maximus,’ because he was the highest philosopher, the highest priest, and 
finally the highest king. And such was the law of  the Egyptians, which stated that 
priests were selected from among the philosophers, and kings from among the priests, 
and Mercury was the first of  each of  these groups, and hence called ‘ter maximus,’ 
quoting the words of  Lactantius. The fable recounts that he was stupefied by the 
sweetness of  harmony, to show that Argos was first tricked by Mercury Trismegistus’s 
stratagem, and slain thereafter.
12. But Antiquity found much entertainment in these fables, because poetic 
matters are in a way a picture, as Flaccus attests:
A poem is like a picture…
and
… painters and poets 
have always had an equal right in hazarding anything.
Therefore, in a poem fiction has power, as painting does; and painting, as the 
Philosopher states in the Politics, was invented for the less cultivated. In a poem, not 
only are the ideas concealed, but also the façade is painted; painting is crafted for the 
uncultivated. Therefore, a wise man of  his own accord infers that in a battle many 
thousands of  men suffered different sorts of  death; he who is short-sighted does not 
understand it unless he sees it painted. Hence painters satisfy the uncultivated—incapable 
as they are of  inferring it by themselves—when they paint horses falling violently, and 
men trampled and pierced, and others fleeing, and others chasing them. But to tease 
out the meaning of  fictions and pictures is the mission of  the wise man; and for this 
reason we mentioned before that philosophers are lovers of  fables, citing the authority 
of  Aristotle, and thus poetics is very useful to both the learned and the unlearned.
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1 The following edition is based upon the editio princeps of  the Latin text: G. Marzio (1548), De 
doctrina promiscua liber varia multiplicique eruditione refertus ac nunc primum in lucem editus, ed. Lorenzo 
Torrentino, Florentiae: apud Laurentium Torrentinum. The princeps has been compared with 
the only extant manuscript (Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. 52. 18) and the relevant 
variations have been added in notes.
2 The attribution of  the Rhetorica ad Herennium to Cicero was common during the middle ages 
and the Italian Quattrocento.
3 Plut. 52. 18: verisimilis.
4 Rhetorica ad Herennium I. VIII. 13.
5 Plut. 52. 18: Comediarum.
6 Plut. 52. 18: placerent.
7 Terence, Andria, Proem., 3: “Populo ut placerent, quas fecisset fabulas.”
8  Plut. 52. 18: magnificat.
9 Plut. 52. 18: accoeptio.
10 Apart from the idea of  rhetoric or forensic practice as fable, the tradition of  mythological 
fables as a means of  persuasion also had a long tradition, for instance in Plato, Leges 886a–890e; 
Cicero, De divinatione I. LVII. 105; and nn. 21 and 22 below. Criticisms against ancient legislators 
for using fables of  this sort became a commonplace during the Quattrocento and the Cinquecento.
11 Juvenal, Satires I, 145: “It nova nec tristis per cunctas fabula cenas.”
12 Suetonius, Augustus LXX. 1.
13 Aristotle, Metaphysics α 2 982b11–21.
14 “Similacem” both in the princeps and in Plut. 52. 18.
15 Plut. 52. 18: hederam.
16 Pliny, Nat. hist XVI. LXIII, 154–155.
17 Plut. 52. 18: in fortunato.
18 Iulius Firmicus Maternus, Matheseos libri octo IV. IX. 8: “The waxing or full Moon moving 
away from Saturn into aspect to Mercury makes the natives obscure, secluded, silent, students 
of  secret and illegal writings, or involved in celestial religions, or experienced in interpretation 
of  the stars. They will be managers of  affairs, public teachers of  the liberal arts, orators 
of  outstanding eloquence, or well known physicians” (A Saturno Luna ad Mercurium. Si a 
Saturno defluens Luna Mercurii se stellae coniunxerit et sit crescens vel plena luminibus, facit obscuros et 
absconsos et tacitos, secretarum et illicitarum litterarum scios aut caelestibus religionibus occupatos aut peritis 
computationibus interpretantes siderum cursus. Facit etiam negotiationibus praepositos et liberalium artium 
publicos magistros, facit oratores eloquentiae splendore fulgentes aut medicos cunctorum testimoniis adornatos), 
tr. Jean Rhys, p. 124, eds. Kroll and Skutsch, t. I, p. 210–11; see also IV. VII. 1 and IV. XIX. 29,
19 Cicero, De natura Deorum III. II; III. VII. 15–19.
20 Gen. 3: 8.
21 Compare Pomponazzi, De incantationibus [1520] X. 68, ll. 331–342: “Moreover, even in 
the Ancient Law, many things are told that cannot really be understood as they appear—for 
example, when it is said that God spoke and that his face was carried on the waters. These are, 
in fact, mystical meanings, and said precisely for the ignorant people, who cannot understand 
incorporeal things. The language of  the Laws, as Averroes states in his Poetics, is similar to 
the language of  the poets, as poets imagine fables that, understood literally, are impossible; 
however, they contain a profound truth, as Plato and Aristotle relate. Poets make up these 
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fables precisely to guide us towards the truth and for the instruction of  the uncultivated 
people. [To teach them] that it is necessary to be good and to avoid evil, we likewise induce 
children to good and keep them away from evil, that is, with the hope of  a reward and the 
fear of  punishment. And we must lead ordinary people to the knowledge of  incorporeal 
things through these bodily images, as we lead the children from a softer food to a stronger 
one” (Nam in Veteri Lege multa feruntur quae re vera non possunt intelligi ut littera sonat, ut cum dicitur 
Deum esse allocutum et eius faciem ferri super aquas; sed sunt sensus mystici et dicti propter ignavum vulgus, 
quod incorporalia capere non potest. Sermo enim Legum, ut inquit Averrores in sua Poesi, est similis sermoni 
poetarum: nam, quamquam poetae fingunt fabulas quae, ut verba sonant, non sunt possibilis, intus tamen 
continent veritatem, ut multoties Plato et Aristoteles referunt. Nam illa fingunt ut in veritatem veniamus et 
rude vulgus instruamus, quod inducere oportet ad bonum et a malo retrahere ut pueri inducuntur et retrahuntur, 
scilicet spe praemii et timore poenae, et per haec corporalia ducere in cognitionem incorporalium, veluti de cibo 
teneriore in cibum solidiorem ducimus infantes), eds. Perrone Compagni and Regnicoli, p. 110, my 
translation.
22 Aquinas, Summa Theol. I, q. 84, art. 5; Id., Super I. Tim, ch. 1, lectio 2: “Fabula enim secundum 
philosophum est composita ex miris, et fuerunt in principio inventae ut dicit philosophus in 
poetria, quia intentio hominum erat ut inducerent ad acquirendum virtutes, et vitandum vitia. 
Simplices autem melius inducuntur repraesentationibus quam rationibus. Unde in miro bene 
repraesentato videtur delectatio, quia ratio delectatur in collatione. Et sicut repraesentatio in 
factis est delectabilis, ita repraesentatio in verbis: et hoc est fabula, scilicet dictum aliquod 
repraesentans, et repraesentando movens ad aliquid. Antiqui enim habebant aliquas fabulas 
accommodatas aliquibus veris, qui veritatem occultabant in fabulis. Duo ergo sunt in fabula, 
quod scilicet contineat verum sensum, et repraesentet aliquid utile. Item quod conveniat illi 
veritati. Si ergo proponatur fabula, quae non potest repraesentare aliquam veritatem, est inanis; 
sed quae non proprie repraesentat, est inepta, sicut fabulae de Thalmuth;” Id., Super Epistolam 
B. Pauli ad Titum lectura, ch. 1, lect. 4; Id., In libros Aristotelis De caelo et mundo expositio I, lect. 22, 
nn. 7–8; ibid., II, lect. I, n. 8: “Et primo excludit errores; secundo concludit veritatem intentam, 
ibi: si itaque quemadmodum et cetera. Circa primum excludit tres opiniones. Quarum prima 
est fabularis. Et dicit quod, quia motus caeli non est laboriosus nec contra naturam, non est 
nec leviter suspicandum quod se habeat sempiternitas caeli et motus eius secundum antiquam 
fabulam Homeri et aliorum poetarum, qui dicebant quod caelum, ad hoc quod conservetur 
in suo situ, indiget quodam gigante, quem vocabant Atlantem, stantem super duas columnas 
et sustentantem humeris caelum. Illi enim qui istum sermonem fabularem composuerunt, 
videntur eandem opinionem habuisse de corporibus caelestibus, quam habuerunt quidam 
posteriores, scilicet ut essent gravia et terrea, ut sic indigeret sursum contra suam naturam 
detineri per aliquam virtutem animatam, vel alicuius rei viventis, puta Dei vel cuiuscumque 
substantiae separatae. Et si quidem hoc dicant caelo esse necessarium propter hoc quod 
caelum habeat gravitatem, fabula est omnino reprobanda: si autem intelligant quod caelum 
habeat naturam talis situs et motus, et tamen natura est ei ab alio causante et conservante, sic 
fabula aliquid divinum continet;” Id., Scriptum super Sententiis quaest. I, Prooem.; Id., Sentencia 
super Meteora II, ch. 1; Id., Sententia libri Metaphysicae I, lect. 4, nn. 15–16; ibid., II, lect. 5, n. 
3; ibid., III, lect. 11, nn. 3–4; ibid., XII, lect. 10, n. 31: “… Reliqua vero introducta sunt 
fabulose ad persuasionem multitudinis, quae non potest capere intelligibilia, et secundum quod 
fuit optimum ad leges ferendas, et ad utilitatem conversationis humanae, ut ex huiusmodi 
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adinventis persuaderetur multitudini, ut intenderent virtuosis actibus et a vitiis declinarent …;” 
etc.; Nicolaus of  Gorran, In VII epistolas canonicas expositio, pars III, ch. 1.
23 Cicero, De natura Deorum II. XXIV. 63.
24 Ibn Sinna, Liber Canonis. Expositio prima in fen quarti II. XVIII. De profunditate somni, quae accidit 
eis: “Oportet ut remoueatur a profunditate somni cum fabulis, et his similibus per voces. Et 
ligentur membra eorum inferiora ligatione dolorosa, postquam non fuerit quod prohibeat. Et 
supponatur collyrium subtile si natura fuerit restricta, et in hora quietis, aut in hora tempois in 
assidua et inseparabili et ventosetur quod est inter ambas spatulas et spondyles.”
25 Suetonius, Augustus LXXVIII. 2.
26 Aristotle, Problemata XVIII. 1. 916b1–19. See also Albertus Magnus, De somno et vigilia III; 
treat. 2; chap. 8, ed Borgnet, pp. 205–206.
27 Plut. 52. 18: omeliis.
28 Plut. 52. 18: alios alios.
29 Marzio’s theory of  spirits is further developed in two chapters of  De doctrina promiscua (XIV 
and XXI; Florentiae: apud Laurentium Torrentinum, 1548, pp. 109–135, esp. 120–121, and 
197–211). His position on the topic is fundamentally based on Galen and Ibn Sinna’s Liber 
Canonis. According to Lynn Thorndike—A History of  Magic and Experimental Science. III–IV. 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries (New York, Morningside Heights: Columbia University Press, 
1934), p. 404—, his exposition of  the relation between planets and metals, diseases, and spirits 
stems from Peter of  Abano’s Conciliator. The reader will find useful information on Ficino’s 
use of  the theory of  the spirits in Clark and Kaske’s introduction to Marsilio Ficino’s De vita 
libri tres: Tempe, AZ: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies—The Renaissance Society 
of  America, 1998, pp. 43–44.
30 Plut. 52. 18: optusi.
31 Virgil, Aen. VI, 522.
32 The princeps reads “inquibus,” most certainly due to a printer’s error. Plut. 52. 18 reads “in 
quibus.”
33 Plut. 52. 18: optusi.
34 Plut. 52. 18: paratiorque.
35 Plut. 52. 18: sollicitudines.
36 Plut. 52. 18: insapientibus.
37 Horace, Ad Pisones 104–105.
38 Plut. 52. 18: iuncatur.
39 Ovid, Metamorphoses XII, 459–532.
40 Ovid, Metamorphoses IX, 666ff.
41 Ovid, Metamorphoses XV, 322–333.
42 The princeps reads “Sitonio,” as does Plut. 52. 18.
43 The allegorical interpretation of  the adultery of  Mars and Venus had an important and long 
tradition both in Greek and in the Latin West, as for instance in Cornutus, Theologiae Graecae 
Compendium 19. 34; Ps-Plutarch’s De vita et poesi Homeri, 101; Proclus, In Platonis Rempublicam 
Comentariis diss. V. XV. K141–K143—Proclus the Successor on Poetics and the Homeric Poems, eds. Kroll 
and Lamberton, trans. Lamberton (Atlanta, GA: Society of  Biblical Literature, 2012), pp. 192–
199—; id., In Platonis Timaeum Commentaria III. 27–28, ed. and trans. D. Baltzly (Cambridge—
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, III. 1), pp. 73–74; Albertus Magnus, Politica 
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II. 7, ed. Borgnet, p. 163; Ficino, Epistulae III. 10. Venus subdues Mars, and Jupiter Saturn (Venus 
Martem, Iupiter Saturnum domat), tr. members of  the Language Department of  the School of  
Economic Science (London: Shepheard-Walwyn, 1978), pp. 15–16; id. Il libro dell’amore V. VIII, 
ed. Niccoli (Firenze: Olschki, 1987), pp. 96–97; etc. Heraclitus the Grammarian’s Allegories and 
his pseudo-alchemical interpretation of  the myth (69) were printed for the first time by Aldus 
Manutius in 1505: Habentur hoc uolumine haec, uidelicet: Vita, & Fabulae Aesophi cum interpretatione 
Latina… [Venetiis]: [apud Aldum], [mense Octobri 1505], sigs. h5r–i6v, wrongly attributed to 
Heraclides Ponticus. The work had a relatively extensive circulation in manuscript before that 
date, see Gombrich’s Symbolic Images. Studies in the Art of  the Renaissance. II, Oxford—New York: 
Phaidon Press, 1978, pp. 67–69 and 82–84. However, Marzio’s astrological interpretation of  
the myth seems to be original.
44 Ovid, Metamorphoses IV, 189.
45 Iulius Firmicus Maternus, Matheseos libri octo VI. XXXI. 60–61: “If  Venus is in those degrees 
of  Taurus in which the Pleiades are located, and Mercury and Mars are either in conjunction 
with the full Moon or in square aspect to her, the native will be captured by bandits and killed, 
struck by a sword. If  Venus is found in Taurus, on the ascendant in square aspect to the full 
moon on the MC, this indicates the same as above” (Si <Venus in Tauro fuerit> constituta, et eas 
Tauri partes teneat, in quibus sunt Pleiades positae, et sit Luna plena luminibus, et Mercurius et Mars aut 
cum ea sint aequata partium societate coniuncti, aut de quadrato latere superiores effecti minaci eam radiatione 
respiciant, qui sic eos habuerit a latronibus captus peribit, sed minacis gladii mucrone percussus. Sed <et> 
si Venus in Tauro cum horoscopo fuerit inventa, et Lunam in MC. constitutam plenam luminibus quadrata 
radiatione percutiat, hoc idem quod diximus simili ratione perficiet), tr. Jean Rhys, p. 216, eds. Kroll and 
Skutsch, t. II, pp. 164–165.
46 Antiscium/a, also antiscion, is an astrological term that refers to the opposite degrees of  the 
zodiac. See Iulius Firmicus Maternus, Matheseos libri octo II. XXIX. Georgius Trapezuntius wrote 
an opuscule on the topic—De brevis antisciis tractatus [1454–1456, princeps 1524]—accompanied 
by his own horoscope and a brief  autobiography, see Lynn Thorndike, A History of  Magic and 
Experimental Science. III–IV. Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries (New York, Morningside Heights: 
Columbia University Press, 1934), pp. 395–396, and Collectanea Trapezuntiana. Texts, Documents, 
and Bibliographies of  George of  Trebizond, ed. John Monfasani, (Binghamton, NY: Medieval and 
Renaissance Texts and Studies in conjunction with The Renaissance Society of  America, 1984), 
pp. 695–697. Giovanni Pontano also devoted an extensive chapter to antisticia ([20.] De antisciis 
et gradibus sibi respondentibus et signis se videntibus) in his De rebus colestibus [1475/1495, thoroughly 
rewritten]: Ioannis Ioviani Pontani Opera omnia soluta oratione composita (Venetiis: in Aedibus Aldi et 
Andreae Soceri), 1518-1519, III (1519), sigs. ooo8v–ppp2v.
47 There are four elemental trigons or triplicities, one each for fire—i.e., Aries, Leo, and 
Sagittarius—, air, earth, and water respectively. They are called trigons because each sign of  
the triplicity is 120º away from the next sign of  that triplicity, and all three together make a 
triangle. These are also related to the so-called planetary “aspects,” the significant angular 
relationships between the planets, as Ptolomeus discusses in the Tetrabiblos I. XVIII [XIX]. 
See different and complementary approaches in Manilius, Astronomicon II, 273–286, and Iulius 
Firmicus Maternus, Matheseos libri octo VI. III–VIII.
48 Claudius Ptolomeus, Tetrabiblos III. XV. 11: “And the rising and morning positions of  both 
Mars and Venus have a contributory effect, to make them more virile and notorious” (Ἄρεως 
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καὶ τοῦ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης πρός τε τὸ ἐπανδρότερον καὶ εὐδιαβοντότερον, οἱ δὲ δυτικοὶ καὶ ἑσπέριοι πρός 
τε τὸ θηλυκώτερον καὶ τὸ κατασταλτικώτερον), ed. and trans. Robbins, pp. 370–371.
49 Plut. 52. 18: optinuit.
50 Together with Lactantius—Div. Inst. I. 7—, the other main classical source for the legend can 
be found in Cicero, De natura Deorum III. XXII. 56; Ovid—Metamorphoses I, 666ff.—lacks the 
identification between Mercury and Hermes Trismegistos. Ficino collected the identification 
for his argumentum before the Pimander—F.A. Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964, p. 116—as Pico della Mirandola did in one of  the 
gatherings at the Academia Marciana and Petrus Crinitus recorded in De honesta disciplina (III. 
2. Disputatio habita inter Hieronymus Savonarolam et Picum Mirandulanum, de philosophia veterum cum 
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